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In 1972 the Court of Appeals of New York ushered in a
new era of land use planning in the United States when it issued
its opinion in Golden v. Planning Board of the Toum of Ram-
apo.' In upholding the constitutionality of timing and sequen-
tial controls for the regulation of metropolitan land develop-
ment, the court approved the first major linkage between plan-
ning and zoning in the shaping of an urban area. This Article
is the outgrowth of a study, prepared by the authors for the
Twin Cities Metropolitan Council, which used the Ramapo con-
cept of controlling the timing and sequence of growth to develop
a program of.planning goals and techniques for the control of
urban sprawl in the Minneapolis-St. Paul region. The study in-
dicated that it may be possible, through regional growth con-
trols, to redistribute a portion of the current rapid growth on
the suburban fringe of the area into the urban core or free-
standing new towns. The region may thus be able to accomplish
its critical objective of regulating urban sprawl while simul-
taneously assuring adequate public facilities for all housing con-
sumers, substantial savings in capital and operational costs, pre-
vention of environmental degradation, creation of permanent
open space, and regional production and distribution of low and
moderate income housing. This Article will explore the urgent
need for growth controls in the region and will analyze the con-
stitutional problems of regulation and the methods, plans, and
techniques which may be used to implement the proposed pro-
gram-
The problems of urban sprawl and improper regional
growth have been at the center of the national consciousness
for at least a decade.2 The current energy and environmental
1. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dis-
missed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
2. Lewis, Waking Up, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1974, at 35, coL 1. A
number of major commissions and study groups have turned their atten-
tion to grappling with these problems and their solutions. The National
Commission on Urban Problems (the Douglas Commission) was di-
rected by the President to study the problems that urban areas are fac-
ing. After two years of deliberation, five volumes of testimony, and
nineteen separate technical reports, the Commission in its final report,
Building the American City, surveyed the problems of suburban de-
velopment, urban sprawl and premature subdivision. It recommended
to the President and the Congress:
At the metropolitan scale, the present techniques of develop-
ment guidance have not effectively controlled the timing and
location of development. Under traditional zoning, jurisdictions
are theoretically called upon to determine in advance the sites
needed for various types of development .... In doing so,
however, they have continued to rely on techniques which were
1974]
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crises have opened the eyes of the country to the ugliness and
costliness of the scattered development and inner city abandon-
ment which have characterized our metropolitan land develop-
ment since World War II. These crises, while signalling the end
of an egregiously affluent, wasteful life style, should be taken
as a challenge to create a more rational system of land use plan-
ning and to revitalize urban life. Instead of a policy of un-
planned growth with a secondary, half-hearted effort towards
never designed as timing devices and which do not function
well in controlling timing. The attempt to use large-lot zoning,
for example, to control timing has all too often resulted in scat-
tered development on large lots, prematurely establishing the
character of much later development-the very effect sought to
be avoided. New types of controls are needed if the basic met-
ropolitan scale problems are to be solved.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS (DOUGLAS COMMISSION),
BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R. Doc. No. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
245 (1968) [hereinafter cited as DOUGLAS COMMISSION].
The Regional Plan Association, in its Second Regional Plan for
Greater New York, describes urban sprawl as follows:
Speculative ventures and premature developments are pushing
Spread City farther and farther out, with isolated new homes
and subdivisions dotted along rural roads as far as 50-80 miles
from major cities.
Regional Plan Association, Second Regional Plan for Greater New York,
90 REGIONAL PLAN NEWS 9 (1969). "The result is 'leapfrogging', the
antithesis of overall planning for an area, which causes scattered devel-
opment, soaring costs of municipal facilities and services to residents."
Noble, A Proposed System for Regulating Land Use in Urbanizing
Counties, ASPO PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE REPORT 16 (1967). The Ad-
visory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations states:
Unplanned development, scattered in random and leap-frogging
fashion over the countryside destroys natural space for the
growing demand for recreation and other purposes. Further-
more, it spirals public service for sewers, water lines, and
school bus transportation.
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN AND
RURAL AMERICA, POLICIES FOR FUTURE GROWTH 12 (Doc. A-32, 1968). The
Report of the National Committee on Urban Growth Policy, "The New
City," states:
A larger public role in the deployment and development
of land.... also means in some cases holding land from devel-
opment for open space or future use and preventing the work
of land that is haphazard and unplanned.
NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON URBAN GROWTH POLICY, THE NEW CITY 113
(1969). The Douglas Commission therefore concludes:
The prevention of urban sprawl should therefore qualify as a
valid public purpose justifying the use of valid zoning and tim-
ing regulations .... The Commission recommends that . . . lo-
cal governments establish holding zones in order to postpone
urban development in areas that are inappropriate for develop-
ment...
NATIONAL CO1VMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, ALTERNATIVES TO URBAN
SPRAWL 45 (Res. Report No. 15, 1968).
For a view that man should consider the rapidly occurring crises




equitable redistribution of wealth, a policy of planned distribu-
tion of scarcity, which will include in its very fabric a fair distri-
bution of amenities to all economic, social and racial groups in
our society, can be developed. The techniques proposed in this
Article for controlling growth would permit the Minneapolis-
St. Paul metropolitan area to shape its growth towards such an
end, while improving the quality of life for all its inhabitants.
A. LAND USE PLANING AND THE PROBLEM OF GROWTH IN AMERICA
In most metropolitan regions of the nation growth has been
taking place almost exclusively on the suburban fringe. This
great movement of people and industry to the suburbs has led
to wasteful and inefficient urban sprawl and leapfrog develop-
ment. Most suburban communities have been unable to provide
adequate municipal facilities for new residential developments.
Developers seeking inexpensive land have located in areas with-
out adequate sewage, roads, police stations, recreation facilities,
and other services, thus shifting the burden of capital investment
to the public sector. The result has been a soaring general prop-
erty tax rate to meet the increased need for public facilities. This
transfer of the true cost of development from the developer and
consumer to the public sector 3 has led to land speculation, de-
struction of environmental resources, defensive incorporations
and annexations, and an increase in the cost of public services.4
Much of the failure to prevent or adequately deal with these
problems can be attributed to two causes. First, most jurisdic-
tions do not adopt a comprehensive approach to urban problems.
Even where there is regional planning on a scale commensurate
with the scope of the problems, sufficient regional power to im-
plement this planning does not exist. The bulk of the power to
regulate land use is shifted by state enabling acts to local political
units and, so held, is at best ineffective. In many instances
this distribution of power is an active impediment to the goals
of effective land use control.
3. Freilich & Levi, Model Regulations for the Control of Land
Subdivision, 36 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1971); Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitu-
tionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban
Resident- Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119, 1134
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Heyman & Gilhool].
4. See Freilich, Golden v. Town of Ramapo: Establishing a New
Dimension in American Planning Law, 4 URB. LAW. ix (1972). Other
consequences of the public bearing the costs of private development are
an imbalance between uses; inefficient use of energy resources because
of sprawling roads and utility lines; poor quality in those services which
are provided due to the extensive demands on the limited resources of
the communities; and an unwillingness to provide adequate housing for
diverse racial, economic and ethnic groups.
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Second, governing bodies have often assumed that the due
process clauses of the state and federal constitutions restrict
their ability to adequately govern the decisions of private land-
owners. Many people in the United States still hold a deep-
seated belief that land ownership is "absolute."' , Of course, un-
der American law, all property is held subject to the police
power, which allows the state to regulate where necessary to
preserve the public health, safety and welfare of the community.
This power is not clearly circumscribed, but is capable of expan-
sion to meet conditions of modern life." Although a flexible
view of the police power was clearly enunciated in the important
early zoning cases, those who framed the precursors of today's
zoning and subdivision ordinances still believed the police power
to be unequal to the task of regulating the orderly growth of
land. Members of early planning bodies thought that communi-
ties could regulate and divide territorial area into use zones or
even provide for flexible planned development, but that regulat-
ing the timing and sequence of the development process was an
impermissible taking of property without just compensation.7 In
addition, even where such narrow interpretations of the due pro-
5. See C. BERGER, LAND OWnERSIUP AND USE 1-14 (1968), for an ex-
cellent discussion of the effect of nuisance and civil rights laws and
land use regulation on the "absolute" right of ownership.
6. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87
(1926):
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but
with the great increase and concentration of population, prob-
lems have developed, and constantly are developing, which re-
quire and will continue to require, additional restrictions in re-
spect of the use and occupation of private lands in urban com-
munities. Regulations, the wisdom, necessity, and validity of
which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that
they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago or even half
a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary
and oppressive....
See also Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 485, 234 P. 381,
383 (1925):
Thus it is apparent that the police power is not a circumscribed
prerogative, but is elastic and, in keeping with the growth of
knowledge and the belief in the popular mind of the need for
its application, capable of expansion to meet existing conditions
of modern life, and thereby keep pace with the social, economic,
moral and intellectual evolution of the human race. In brief
there is nothing known to the law that keeps more in step with
human progress than does the exercise of this power. (empha-
sis added)
Cf. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370
P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962).
7. For an excellent analysis of the due process clause as a restric-
tion on land use regulation, see F. BossrtMAN, D. CALLis & J. BANTA,
THE TAKING ISSUE (1973), particularly for the showing that courts have
been limiting taking questions to fewer and fewer areas in order to ex-
pand the natural role of land regulation in a complex society.
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cess clause were not invoked, governing bodies were constrained
by equally restrictive readings of the state enabling acts from
which their powers were derived; thus no direct remedy dealing
with scattered development and urban sprawl was ever con-
sidered. Instead, communities sought to remedy the defects
through zoning devices intended for other purposes. Agricul-
tural and industrial holding zones, numerical quotas, excessive
large lot zoning, elimination of multiple family uses, and mini-
mum floor area restrictions have all been improperly utilized
as growth control devices.$ Unfortunately, these devices have
further exacerbated the problem and resulted in the disastrous
side effect of excluding low and moderate income families.0
B. THE M MAOLIS-ST. PAUL EXPERIENCE
Two recent reports comprehensively document that the de-
velopment currently being experienced in the Twin Cities metro-
politan area mirrors the national pattern. These reports note the
following trends: 1
(1) Agricultural activities are moving further away from
the urban core, opening up large amounts of vacant land for
housing developments in a 12 county area within a 50 mile rad-
ius of Minneapolis-St. Paul;
(2) The population of the region is rapidly growing in a
wide band of middle-outer suburbs, tapering off in the inner
suburbs and declining in the two central cities;
(3) Development is dispersing into pockets of housing at
sites scattered along lakes and roads far out into the previously
rural countryside, resulting in the creation of 25 new municipal-
ities within the last 10 years;
(4) More than 85 percent of the predicted 830,000-880,000
population increase in the region by 1990 will fall within the
middle-outer suburban rings, and beyond;
(5) Rapidly expanding urban sprawl and increasingly scat-
8. Cutler, Legal and Ilegal Methods for Controlling Community
Growth on the Urban Fringe, 1961 Wis. L. RErv. 370.
9. AwmacAc SocI=NY or PLANNING OFFICIALS, NEw DIRECONs IN
CoNNECTIcuT PLANNING LEGISLATION: A STUDY OF CONNEcCcUT PLAN-
NMG, ZONING Am RELATED STATuTEs 217 (1967); DouGLAs CouMssioN,
supra note 2, at 245.
10. CmzENs LEAGUE PLANNED UNIT DEmVLOpmmT ComnrrnF,
Mhomaporm, GRowTH WrrmouT SPRAWL (September 19, 1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as CITzEs LEAGUE REPORT]; TWIN CrrIs MnoproTAN CouN-
cIL, DiscussioN STAT nn ON METoPoLTrAN DEVELOPmENT PorIcY (Oc-




tered development are resulting in more costly public and pri-
vate facilities, inefficient use of capital investment in built-up
areas, loss of valuable open space, high costs in abating sub-
stantial surface and ground water pollution, and vastly increased
rates of taxation. -A side effect of this scattered development
is competition between communities, which produces further
fragmentation, imbalance in the provision of housing and public
services, and serious energy problems.
To address these problems, the Metropolitan Council is at-
tempting to determine the feasibility of implementing timing
and sequential growth control policies for the region. In partic-
ular, it is considering whether timing controls, including devel-
opment easement acquisition and open land taxation policies, can
be developed for rural and urban service areas and whether con-
trols which can be sustained beyond a first generation capital
improvement plan can be formulated for agricultural and open
space areas.
A physical development framework has been published
which proposes a regional policy for managed growth based on
timing and sequential controls and incorporates maximal local
government involvement and decision-making. The Physical
Development Framework Policy begins by dividing the metro-
politan region into five separate planning areas: Planning Area
I consists of the metro centers, the downtown areas of Minne-
apolis and St. Paul; Planning Area II, the central city and older
suburban areas; Planning Area III, the areas of active urbaniza-
tion; Planning Area IV, the rural areas; and Planning Area V,
free-standing new towns and cities within the rural area. Certain
objectives have been set for each planning area, and the Council
has suggested how development and redevelopment should be
carried out in each area consistently with these objectives. For
Planning Area I these objectives include attracting financial in-
stitutions, specialized professional and retail functions, office
space users, and regional cultural and entertainment complexes
and encouraging a broader socio-economic mix. The Planning
Area II objectives emphasize the maintenance of structures and
neighborhoods in generally sound condition, the redevelopment
or rehabilitation of deteriorating neighborhoods, the construc-
tion of new houses in types and densities consistent with the mar-
ket preferences of the population at large, the removing of un-
certainties about the future of older neighborhoods and the re-
duction of concentrations of minorities and low income families.
The goals set forth for Planning Area III include supporting
growth and additional public investment as needed to complete
1016 [Vol. 58:1009
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development of skipped over land in municipalities that have
already invested in capital facilities, opening up new land for
urbanization in a staged, contiguous manner through capital
budgeting of public service extensions, and providing balanced
housing types for a variety of income levels.1
Planning Area IV would, at least for the generation of capi-
tal investment in built-up and contiguous areas, remain primar-
ily rural, with provision for the optional development of free
standing new towns and communities. The restriction of growth
and prevention of sprawl in Planning Area IV should result in
greater reinvestment in Planning Areas I and II and a revitaliza-
tion of the core of the region. The policies for Planning Area
IV center around the preservation of an agricultural economic
base and lifestyle, primarily through the enforcement of stand-
ards for residential development which will absolutely prevent
public health and pollution problems and prohibit the extension
of metropolitan-scale facilities or services into the area. Finally,
the Council suggests that Planning Area V be reserved for free-
standing new towns or rural communities in which development
of a local economic base for growth will be emphasized. Each
Planning Area V community will also be surrounded by a Plan-
ning Area III development of staged, contiguous growth to pre-
vent scattered development and sprawl.
Throughout all the areas designated in the regional plan,
low and moderate income housing would be encouraged. Where
necessary, both subsidies resulting from capital cost savings and
a bonus and incentive program for developers would be used.
This Article reviews and analyzes the legal techniques that
are available to implement regional development growth pol-
icies. Thus, for Planning Area III a complete analysis of the
Ramapo plan as well as other police power controls is explored.
For Planning Area IV a combination of compensatory tech-
niques, low density zoning, and transfers of development rights
is proposed. The decisions, policies and guidelines of the Coun-
cil, as well as statutory, constitutional and case law, are analyzed
from both the national and Minnesota perspectives in order to
ascertain whether existing legal powers are adequate to author-
ize these techniques. The analysis extends to the questions of
whether the techniques are constitutionally permissible and
whether the past policies of Minnesota and the Metropolitan
Council accommodate the philosophy of timed and sequential
11. Cnazms LEAGUE REPORT, supra note 10, also calls for the




growth. It is our conclusion that there are no constitutional im-
pediments to the use in Minnesota of the various legal techniques
analyzed; however, there is a need for legislative authorization
in order to implement properly and effectively a regional growth
control guidance system.
II. POLICIES OF THE METROPOLITAN COUNCIL
WITH RESPECT TO URBAN GROWTH CONTROL
A. POLICIEs RESPECTING URBAN GROWTH CONTROL
In its role as coordinator of the planning and development
of the metropolitan Minneapolis-St. Paul area, the Metropolitan
Council is empowered to prepare and adopt a comprehensive de-
velopment guide which will direct "an orderly and economic de-
velopment, public and private, of the metropolitan area.' 2 The
Council has repeatedly recognized through its decisions, policies,
and guidelines the need to regulate the timing and sequence of
growth. In seeking to control urbanization in the metropolitan
area, Council policies have developed in two directions. First,
the Council has supported programs of preservation and rehabil-
itation within that part of the metropolitan area which is al-
ready truly urban or suburban 3 in order to encourage a redirec-
tion of growth back into the city proper. Second, upon the as.
sumption that new areas must be urbanized to provide services
for a growing population, the Council has developed policies to
control growth in areas of active urbanization."4
1. Policies for the Already Existing Urban Areas
The Council's policy stresses the maximum use and reuse
of existing structures and already-developed areas. There is
a strong commitment to increasing the liveability and viability
of the downtown districts, older commercial areas, and older resi-
dential neighborhoods.' 5 The concept of timed development is
most suitably applied in areas that are not yet developed or that
are still undergoing development; therefore, this concept does not
play a direct role in the center city policies of the Council ex-
12. Metropolitan Council Act, MINN. STAT. § 473B.06(5) (1971).
13. METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT DIsCUSSION STATEMENT, Planning
Areas I & II, supra note 10, at 15.
14. METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT DiscussioN STATEMENT, Planning
Area III, supra note 10, at 19.
15. Twin Cities Metropolitan Council, Metropolitan Development
Framework, Existing Policy Analysis, 45-92 (Technical Background Re-




cept insofar as a staged renewal or rehabilitation program is
established. However, the actual timing and staging of growth
in urbanizing areas is directly influenced by the success of at-
tracting growth back into the cities, for an effective revitalization
of the older metro area should diminish the need for additional
urbanization elsewhere.
2. Policies for Areas of Active Urbanization
The Council has devoted the bulk of its attention to areas
where active urbanization is underway. This emphasis is the re-
sult of the realization that both the viability of the older metro-
politan areas and the continued existence of a rural hinterland
are inextricably tied to development policies in the rural-urban
fringe. Urbanization which is not integrated with development
in the central city and older suburbs fragments the metro area,
unnecessarily duplicates pre-existing services, and wastes rural
land that need not yet undergo the painful adolescence of urbani-
zation.
Council policies for areas of active urbanization necessar-
ly depend upon analyses of problems within the context of time.
The decision to plan is, in effect, the choice to acknowledge the
interplay of growth and time; thus, the underpinnings of Coun-
cil policy lie in projections of population growth in the metro
area by the year 2000. The Council has recognized that to regu-
late growth adequately over time it must use planning tools both
of definite duration, such as capital improvement and short- and
long-term development plans, and of flexible and indefinite dur-
ation, such as "as long as they are needed,"' 6 "pay as you use" 7
and "availability of services""' plans.
An example of the crucial role phased development concepts
play in Council policies for areas of active urbanization can be
seen in the Council Sewer Program. 9 The present Sewer Guide
16. Id. at 52.
17. Id. at 59.
18. Id. at 136.
19. The goal of phased and timed development is also apparent
in other policies of the Council:
1. Transportation
The Council's Metropolitan Development Framework states that
"[hJighway investment should support staged development of the ur-
banizing portions of the Metropolitan Area.... Transportation facilities
help achieve the desired urban result if a coordinated and staged trans-
portation-development plan is followed." Id. at 94. Accordingly, the
Council has proposed that transit guideways be provided "in a staged




states that the orderly growth and development of the metro
area can be encouraged by the phased extension of interceptors
to which developments must connect.20 Decisions on sewers are
to be made in accordance with Sewer Policy 17, whereby plans
,and programs of providing central sewer service to urban areas
are formulated according to the following priorities:
(1) [To] serve existing development that is subject to imme-
diate threats to public health or safety, or that is produc-
ing serious pollution of natural resources;
(2) [To] serve areas that are scheduled to open up for devel-
opment within five years consistent with other metropoli-
tan development policies, giving top priority to higher den-
sity areas and lower priority to lower density areas;
(3) [To] serve remaining development that requires sewers.2 1
The Council's guidelines and procedures for review of commun-
ity comprehensive sewer plans (CSP) state that one of the key
points to be contained in such plans is an incremental construc-
tion program. In order to prevent the extension of an interceptor
through open land from operating to disrupt this incremental ap-
proach, the Council has determined that construction of such an
interceptor will not automatically open the area up for develop-
ment. Rather, the interceptor construction is to be viewed as
compatible with the staged economic extension of sewers con-
templated by the Council for the Metropolitan Service Region. 2
The same goal of orderly and economic growth is apparent
in the Council's newly-developed system for the allocation of
2. Housing
The Council has promoted policies favoring housing development
"timed to coincide with the economical and orderly provision of such
urban level services as central sewer and water facilities, adequate pub-
lic roads and transportation systems . . . ." Id. at 133. Council policy
states that timed extension and addition of services is the preferred way
to achieve a priority system designed to encourage residential develop-
ment within or contiguous to the urbanized portion of the region. Id.
Development of services should occur on a priority basis, e.g.,
First Priority-Mostly developed with 35 per cent or less of the
land undeveloned.
Second Priority-Developing/developed with between 36 and
60 per cent of the land undeveloped.
Third Priority-Rural/developing with between 61 and 89 per
cent of the land undeveloped.
Fourth Priority-Rural with over 90 per cent of the land unde-
veloped. Id. at 136.
3. Recreation Open Space
The Council has declared that "the provision of recreation open
space should be an orderly process requiring a local recreation open
space plan and five-year capital improvement program." Id. at 157.
20. Id. at 51.
21. Id. at 53.
22. Id. at 58.
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reserve capacity costs, the Service Availability Charge.2 3 Under
this system, developers are assessed according to a "pay as you
use" rather than a "pay as you can" formula. The timing ele-
ment of this system is highly flexible, so that it can respond
to the needs and pressures generated by a growing population.
The Council's implementation of orderly development thus
depends to a large degree upon controlling development by tim-
ing. The Council has established priorities expressed in terms
of years and has suggested capital improvement plans of finite
duration. It has also relied upon concepts of flexible staging
expressed in terms of such variables as need and availability
of services. The Council has not confined development to a
strict timetable. Rather its timing controls are currently char-
acterized by their fluidity. There is no doubt, however, that
the goal of orderly and economical development could justify
more stringent timing controls than the Council presently
chooses to use.
B. POWERS OF THE COUNCIL TO IMPLEMENT
REGIONAL GROWTH CONTROL
Even the mosi thoughtfully created and clearly articulated
policies have little consequence in the absence of the power to
implement them. The lack of stringency and definiteness in
Council timing and staging policies probably reflects more an
awareness of powerlessness than a conscious choice to impose
flexible controls. The Council, as a creature of the legislative
will, can exercise only those powers delegated to it. It lacks suf-
ficient police power and possibly the power to enter cooperative
compacts with other governmental entities. The Council stands
in the unenviable position of a coordinator with very limited
means to enforce coordination upon those who do not wish to
cooperate.
Enabling legislation has not vested the Council with a uni-
form grant of supervisory power; power delegated by the state
varies according to the subject matter to be supervised. The
Council has its greatest amount of authority in the area of sewer
services. In addition to its usual review powers under the Metro-
politan Council Act, the Council has recently been granted control
over sewer matters of metropolitan significance.2 4  In addi-
23. Id. at 59.




tion, it reviews applications for assistance under federal grant
and loan programs.2 5 Further, the Council is empowered by the
Metropolitan Sewer Service Act 2 to give binding approval or dis-
approval to local sewer plans. While the Council also has consid-
era'ble power to control solid waste disposal,27 as the Metropoli-
tan Development Framework indicates, the processes of solid
waste disposal do not contain the same urban shaping potential
as does the development of a regional sewer system.28
Apart from sewage and solid waste control, however, the
Council's powers are basically restricted to review and recom-
mendation. These restrictions can render the Council's best at-
tempts to create area-wide plans worthless. For example, the
only result of the Council's disapproval of the Watergate proj-
ect 29 was that the project was forced to utilize nonfederal fi-
nancing, taking it outside of Council jurisdiction.
C. POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES
Under existing legislation the role of the Metropolitan
Council to influence and shape regional policy is limited. The
Council could affect three alternative postures to expand its role
under current law:
(1) Influence patterns of growth through regional capital im-
provement plans and projects.
25. The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§
4231-33 (1970), as effectuated through the rules promulgated in the Of-
fice of Management and Budget Circular A-95, provides for review of
applications for assistance under more than 100 federal grant and loan
programs by state, regional and metropolitan clearing houses. See Hey-
man, Legal Assaults on Municipal Land Use Regulations, 5 Urs. LAW. 1,
17 (1973). The reviews are advisory only, and seek to identify the rela-
tionship of proposed projects to area comprehensive plans. The review
requirement, originally established under section 204 of the Demonstra-
tion Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. § 3301
et seq. (1970), has stimulated the creation of regional councils of govern-
ments and preparation of regional plans, but it will obviously not re-
gionalize land use planning. Occasionally certain areas have used A-95
review to stimulate a regional program. For example, Dayton, Ohio's
Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission "fair share housing" plan
was designed to distribute low and moderate income housing equitably,
but the plan has not been particularly successful. Craig, The Dayton
Area's "Fair Share" Housing Plan Enters the Implementation Phase, 6
CITY, Jan.-Feb. 1972, at 50. Moreover, the effectiveness of A-95 review
has been further weakened by its omission from general revenue sharing
under the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. § 1221
et seq. (Supp. II, 1972).
26. MmNN. STAT. § 473C.06(3) (1971).
27. MINN. STAT. § 473D.03(1) (1971).
28. Metropolitan Development Framework, supra note 15, at 203.
29. Id. at 150.
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(2) Enter into cooperation agreements with governmental en-
tities in the region. However, the power to enter into
such agreements is granted only to those governmental
entities which are empowered by Minnesota law with the
power to zone,3 0 a power not granted the Council. Even
if authority to enter into such contracts could be implied,
this approach would of necessity be piecemeal, and would
tend to fragment rather than unify the metropolitan area.
(3) Attempt to use its powers of review over federal grants
and loans to force compliance with the regional plan. As
the Watergate project shows, however, an unfavorable de-
cision does not necessarily stop a project which conflicts
with Council plans. Furthermore, it is questionable
whether under the statute this is a legitimate use of the
power of review.
Each of these approaches has serious limitations; existing
legislation simply does not delegate sufficient power to the
Council to permit it to plan and control growth in the metropoli-
tan area effectively. New legislation is vital and would supple-
ment the powers recently granted to the Council by the Metro-
politan Reorganization Act of 1974.31 New legislation addressed
solely to the Council or relating to all regional planning districts
and local governmental units could be sought.
As will be shown in subsequent sections, a comprehensive
range of new techniques must be established by the Council.
These techniques will require the use of regulatory, compensa-
tory and financial powers. At a minimum
, 
the Council will re-
quire power to (1) review comprehensive planning of local com-
munities to insure that local plans and implementing ordinances
are in accordance with regional planning, particularly capital
improvement programming; (2) condemn land to insure that en-
vironmentally critical areas are preserved, and that long term
open space areas in Planning Area IV are provided through de-
velopment easement acquisition, land banking, and transfers of
development rights; (3) insure that housing for low and
moderate income families is located throughout the region, and
provide for rehabilitation and insurance of blighted and transi-
tional areas and compensation for affected communities and
property owners in Planning Area IV; and (4) enter into inter-
governmental agreements with local governmental units which
will cover all areas of planning and environmental concerns
and would include provisions for technical service and assis-
tance.
Local governments must remain the essential link in the
process, retaining decision-making powers at the implementation
30. MIN. STA. § 394.32 (1971).
31. Minn. Laws 1973 ch. 422, amending MINm. STAT. ch. 473B (1971).
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stage of the planning process. They will, however, require ex-
tensive new powers, including power to utilize timing and se-
quential controls in zoning and subdivision regulation; to impose
interim development controls to protect the planning process;
to provide for capital improvement planning and long term bud-
geting; to utilize flexible zoning, subdivision and official map-
ping techniques; and to grant assessment relief for restricted
properties.
III. STATE AND REGIONAL POLICIES SUPPORTING
REGIONAL URBAN GROWTH CONTROL
The next two sections will deal with the two major hurdles
confronting utilization of growth controls on a broad scale.
First, the constitutionality of growth control and its many plan-
ning facets must be established. This problem will be discussed
in Section IV. The second critical problem for comprehensive
growth control lies in the level and scope of the regulatory unit
itself.
Traditional approaches in land use control have concen-
trated decision-making power at the local or municipal level and,
perhaps secondarily, at the county level. Only rarely has the
power to control land use been exercised by the state or a re-
gional unit. The traditional lack of state initiative has not been
a result of impotence. States have inherent power over their
political subdivisions and, within the limits of equal protection
and due process, can add to or withdraw the power delegated
to local units at will.32 It is becoming increasingly apparent
that there are many advantages to control at a higher level over
land use problems. A number of crucial land use problems are
not local in either effect or origin, and the scope of effective
regulation must be commensurate with them. It is proving im-
possible to successfully regulate regional problems with a frag-
32. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Hunter v. Pitts-
burgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1912). Minnesota takes a very strong position in
this regard. Local units are deemed state agents and power can be
added or withdrawn at the will of the state in spite of home rule Dro-
visions. Monaghan v. Armatage, 218 Minn. 108, 15 N.W.2d 241 (1944).
An important recent New York decision has held that the state may
completely override local planning and zoning at will. Floyd v. New
York State Urban Dev. Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 1, 300 N.E.2d 704, 347 N.Y.S.2d
161 (1973). Cf. Board of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Comm'n, 294 N.E.2d
393 (Mass. 1973), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
sustained the validity of a statute authorizing a state board of appeals
to override municipal zoning regulations with respect to certain low and
moderate income housing projects.
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mented network of controls.33
In response to this necessity, states are passing statutes to
recapture some of the police power previously delegated to
municipalities and exercise it on the state or regional level.5
A great many of these new regional acts seek to protect critical
environmental areas, as well as coastal zones and wetlands. The
usual approach is for the statute to establish a regional commis-
sion and a set of state or regional standards; it is usually pro-
vided that if a locality fails to protect the designated areas, the
state or regional commission will have the power to implement
its statutory duty.35 There are also a growing number of states
which have established regional control over areas where critical
problems transcend political boundaries, and they have fared
well in the courts3 These regional control bodies do not repre-
33. See Heyman, Legal Assaults on Municipal Land Use Regula-
tion, 5 URn. LAw. 1 (1973).
34. For a recent summary, see F. BossELmAx & D. CALLIES, THE
QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971), and ALI MODEL
LAND DEVELoPMENT CODE (Tent. Draft No. 1 (1968), Tent. Draft
No. 2 (1970), and Tent. Draft No. 3 (1971)), proposing in Arti-
cles 7 and 8 new enabling legislation for state involvement in land use
planning and control; CouNcIL OF STATE GoVERm=INTS, TaE STATES'
ROLE IN LAND RESOuRCE MANAGEMENT (1972). See also R. FREcuLC, Mis-
SOURI PLANNING LEGISLATION FOR STATE, REGIONAL AND LOcAL GOVERN-
ME TS (1973) (a two-volume study prepared for the Missouri Depart-
ment of Community Affairs).
35. Coastal zone acts have been adopted by California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Rhode Island,
and Washington. Wetlands acts, which may be similar to, and over-
lap with, coastal zone acts, have been adopted by Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington, and
Wisconsin. For state environmental policy acts see CAL. PuB. REs. CODE
ANN. § 21000 et seq. (West Supp. 1974); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 7, § 7001 et
seq. (1972); ANN. CODE OF MD., art. 41, § 447 et seq. (1973); MASS. GEN.
L. ANN., ch. 30, §§ 61, 62 (1972); MIcH. ComP. L. ANN., § 691.1201 et
seq. (1970); Mm. STAT. § 116D.01 et seq. (Supp. 1973); MONT. Rzv.
CODES ANN. § 69-650 et seq. (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-20-1
et seq. (Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-1 et seq. (1971); CODE OP
VA. ANN., ch. 1-8, § 10-17.107 et seq. (1973); WAsH. REV. CODE § 43.21C-
.010 (1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 1.17 (1971).
36. Minn. Laws 1973, ch. 422 § 12, amending MINN. STAT. ch. 473B(1971). New Jersey controls the Hackensack Meadowlands with a re-
gional agency. The control was sustained in Meadowlands Regional
Redev. Agency v. New Jersey, 63 N.J. 35, 304 A.2d 545 (1973). New
York controls the Adirondack Park with a regional agency; Vermont
has the State Land Use and Development Plans Act of 1973, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 6001 et seq. (1973). The Maine Site Location Law, M.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 481 et seq. (1970), was upheld in In re Spring
Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973). Massachusetts provides for
state level review of some exclusionary zoning problems, a practice
sustained in Board of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Comm'n, 294 N..2d
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sent a cooperative federalism with local implementation in accord
with state or regional standards. Rather, they represent direct
control by special regulatory units whose boundaries encompass
the problem areas.
A. VALIDITY OF REGIONAL APPROACHES
The utilization of regional and state level units for the exer-
cise of zoning and planning power will necessitate a new delega-
tion or redelegation of the police power. Jurisdictions that have
considered the issue have held that delegation to regional bodies
is both a constitutionally reasonable means to the legitimate end
of regional problem solving and a valid technique under appli-
393 (Mass. 1973). Florida has the Environmental Land and Water Man-
agement Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. ANN. §. 380.012 (1972). Louisiana
moved in 1972 to protect the Atchafalaya Basin. A Summary of State
Land Use Controls, LAND USE PLANNING REPORTS, Spec. Rep. No. 1, Sep.,
1973, at 12. In California, the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Devel-
lopment Commission, authorized under the Coastal Zone Conservation
Commission Act, CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 27104 (West 1972), was sustained
in Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and
Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970), and the
Tahoe Regional Development Compact, CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 66801
(West 1968) was sustained in People ex rel. Younger v. County of El
Dorado, 5 Cal. 3d 480, 487 P.2d 1193, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1971).
Centralization of land use control could increase even more rapidly
with the adoption of a federal land use planning bill such as the Land
Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act of 1973, S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973), which was passed by the Senate, but died in the House
Rules Committee. The Act contemplated five annual grants to the states,
covering up to 90 percent of the cost of developing a state land use pro-
gram. Three subsequent annual grants would cover up to two-thirds of
administrative costs. A total of 800 million dollars would have been ap-
portioned to the various states in accordance with the scope of their prob-
lems and their financial need. The grants would have been a supplement
to present funding, not a replacement, but they would not have been
usable for land banking.
To qualify for grants under the Senate Act, the state would have
been required to develop a land use planning process within three years,
including a state level planning agency, an inventory of land and na-
tural and human resources, and a program to regulate land sales and
developments of more than fifty units which are located more than ten
miles from the SMSA. Within five years, the state would have had
to develop a land use program, including methods to control areas of
critical ecological concern, areas of historic interest, areas around key
government facilities, developments of more than local significance, and
methods to assure the local regulations would not create an imbalance
of land uses.
The bill contemplated federal review to determine the efficacy of
planning and implementation, and sanctions ranging from loss of plan-
ning benefits to loss of unrelated highway, airport and recreational
grants were considered, although the latter sanctions were stripped from
the bill both in the Senate and in the House Committees.
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cable state law.37 As will be discussed, the ultimate validity
and efficacy of police power regulation by any level of jurisdic-
tional authority will depend upon resolution of the constitu-
tional issues of due process and taking. The nature of the unit
exercising the power may, however, make a difference in the
outcome of decisions on the validity of regulation. Though the
scope of the unit does not change the essential nature of the
exercise of police power, it does bring some different considera-
tions to the balancing process which may affect the outcome.
For example, governmental units are invariably required by
statute or case law to exercise zoning power pursuant to a com-
prehensive plan.38 When a comprehensive plan is drafted by
a regional body, it is far less likely to be influenced by parochial
considerations, and far more likely to be in accord with the scope
of the problem. Therefore, even if regulation is severe in certain
areas, a reviewing court, on examination of the plan, can more
easily assure itself that exclusion of third parties is not its objec-
tive.3 9
A regional unit should be utilized where a problem is wide-
spread and a harm to a large segment of the population is
threatened. It has been established that the police power can
be used in land use regulation even by small neighborhood
groups, as long as the interests advanced are not purely pri-
37. People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5 Cal. 3d 480,
487 P.2d 1193, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1971); Candlestick Properties, Inc. v.
San Francisco Bay Conservation and Dev. Comnm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557,
89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970); Board of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Comm'n,
294 NE.2d 393 (Mass. 1973); Meadowlands Regional Redev. Agency
v. New Jersey, 63 N.J. 35, 304 A.2d 545 (1973). The courts often
note that state or regional level regulation is a necessary as well
as reasonable means of protecting statewide interests. In Te Spring Val-
ley Dev, 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973).
38. See, e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Ore.
1973). On the other hand, localities have not been required to develop
a comprehensive plan in order to adopt zoning ordinances, despite the
Standard Zoning Enabling Act's prerequisite that zoning must be "in ac-
cordance with a comprehensive plan." Kozesnik v. Township of Mont-
gomery, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957); Haar, In Accordance with a Com-
prehensive Plan, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1154 (1955). The plan, if not an offi-
cially adopted master plan, will be considered to be the whole history
of development policies of the community. Albright v. Town of Man-
lius, 34 App. Div. 2d 419, 312 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1970), modified, 28 N.Y.2d
108, 268 N.E.2d 785, 320 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1971); Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d
463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968).
39. Nopro Co. v. Town of Cherry Hills Village, 504 P.2d 344 (Colo.
1972). Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.
2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). For an example of how
considerations relating to unnamed third parties can influence validity,
see In re Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
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vate;40 however, the wider the scope of regulation the more ap-
parent is the public nature of the interest sought to be protected.
Thus, a wider scope has an influence on the weight of the legiti-
mate public objective, and this in turn can result in the constitu-
tional imposition of a greater impact on the individual.41
B. MINNESOTA EXPERIENCE WITH STATE AND REGIONAL PLANNING
Minnesota, like many states, provides for state and regional
comprehensive planning.42 However, the planning is primarily
advisory,43 and the bulk of the police power is concentrated
among the various local units.
All counties, except Ramsey and Hennepin, can plan com-
prehensively and can implement the plan with zoning, subdi-
vision regulations, and interim controls.44 However, the signifi-
cance of this power from a growth control standpoint is dimin-
ished somewhat because county political boundaries are rarely
the boundaries of the problem areas, and because counties have
no control over incorporated areas. Municipalities and urban
towns can also plan comprehensively and can implement the plan
with subdivision regulation, official mapping, zoning, and capital
improvement plans. The exercise of these powers must be "in
accordance with a comprehensive plan," but, as in other jurisdic-
tions, the courts do not equate a comprehensive plan with com-
prehensive planning.4-5 However, there are a number of statu-
tory requirements that "due cognizance" be taken of adjacent
municipalities in the formulation of plans and controls." The
judicial branch can participate in this ad hoc regionalism by re-
solving conflicts between units with a "balancing of public inter-
ests" test.47
40. Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969).
41. Cf. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 701(1972); Binder, Taking Versus Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal
in Light of Regional Planning and Wetlands, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1972).
42. MINN. STAT. §§ 462.381-.396 (1971).
43. See text accompanying notes 24-29 supra.
44. MINN. STAT. §§ 394.21-.37 (1971).
45. Connor v. Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d
789 (1957); see also note 38 supra.
46. MINN. STAT. §§ 394.06-.17 (1971).
47. Town of Oronoco v. City of Rochester, 293 Minn. 468, 197 N.W.
2d 426 (1972). Regional factors are not expressed in the concept or
definition of "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" in the zoning
enabling acts, and are therefore used only by a limited (albeit growing)
number of courts as decisional factors in passing on the validity of local
zoning ordinances. The judicial art in this respect is embryonic. Cer-
tain conclusions can, however, be drawn. Initially, it is apparent that
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Even though much of the regulatory power remains frag-
mented among local units with only patchy and incomplete sub-
stitutes for true regional control, there is a growing legislative
trend in Minnesota toward regional control of urban area func-
tions and of state-wide interests affected by uncontrolled devel-
opment. An examination of recent and proposed legislation in-
dicates that the state may be on the verge of adopting a regional
approach to comprehensive land use planning and growth con-
troL
1. Orderly Annexation
An analysis of Minnesota annexation law makes it clear that
a preference for orderly, rational growth characterizes municipal
boundary changes in Minnesota. Together, legislators and
judges have formulated a state policy of annexation whereby
municipal boundary changes depend upon the objective condi-
the courts have almost always used regional factors in a negative or
static sense, considering whether the proposed zoning is compatible with
the existing state of the locality and region rather than whether thefuture needs of the region require the change. McDermott v. Village
of Calverton Park, 454 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1970) (single family zoning in
1953 constitutes the planning of the area); Huttig v. City of Richmond
Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833, 841 (Mo. 1963); Borough of Cresskill v. Borough
of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954). Where the courts
have used regional factors affirmatively and prospectively, as in the
cases of In re Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970)
and Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), in which local
zoning practices were invalidated because of their exclusionary effect
on residents from adjoining central cities, the decisions have been just
as blind to regional planning needs by the single-minded dicta that
every municipality, no matter what its size, or what the regional needs
are, must have multi-family zoning and small-sized lots. Cadoux v.
Planning and Zoning Comm'n of the Town of Weston, 162 Conn. 425,
294 A.2d 582, cert. denied, 408 U.S. 924 (1972). Such decisions, though
admirably egalitarian, are as parochial from the planning standpoint
as the decisions to exclude. It would seem that a balance between total
exclusion and total inclusion is possible, and that equal protection need
not be deemed incompatible with comprehensive regional planning.
One reason why the courts have tended to emphasize negative fac-
tors lies in the restrictive standing requirements in zoning cases which
have always favored resident landowners. See Ayer, The Primitive
Law of Standing in Land Use Disputes: Some Notes from a Dark Con-
tinent, 55 IowA L. REv. 344 (1969). The breakthrough in permitting
non-residents to challenge the validity of zoning ordinances, Park View
Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972); Allen
v. Coffel, 488 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. App. 1972), even across state lines, Town-
ship of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1968),
argues well for a more expansive, positive role of the judiciary in these
matters. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Pro-
cedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
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tion of the territory involved rather than upon the often paro-
chial and subjective desires and interests of inhabitants of either
the territory sought to be annexed or of the annexing body.
Because intensive development in America is no longer feasible
outside the bounds of governmental entities capable of providing
necessary services, municipal boundary changes should serve as
barometric indicators of growth conditions within an area. The
significance of a state policy favoring orderly annexation there-
fore transcends the technicalities of municipal administration,
for such a policy is an essential element in any attempt to plan,
time, and control growth.
The keystone to Minnesota annexation law lies in the re-
quirement that the property to be annexed be "so conditioned
as properly to be subjected to village government." Since the
Minnesota Supreme Court read this requirement into the 1913
annexation statute48 by reasoning that the qualifications for ter-
ritory included in an original incorporation should also extend
to territory sought to be annexed, 49 it has been an integral 'part
of the state's annexation law. Although its language has changed
and it has moved from judicial construction to explicit statutory
expression,"° its philosophy remains the same: it is the condition
of the territory to be annexed that determines whether annexa-
tion will occur. Furthermore, the supreme court and the legisla-
ture have consistently concluded that the territorial condition
which will trigger annexation must be one of present or impend-
ing urban (or suburban) development. Thus, the court has
traditionally refused to allow annexation of areas which are
basically rural and appear to be destined to remain so in the
reasonably foreseeable future.Y
The refusal to impound primarily agricultural land within
urban boundaries unless "being approached . . . by the onward
march of an expanding residential population or ... likely to
be so approached in the reasonably foreseeable future"'' is a
state decision to avoid contribution to the complex of pressures
that leads to premature urban-suburban development of rural
land. Thus, the "so conditioned" requirement is a mainstay of
the policy in favor of ordered and orderly municipal growth.
By preventing premature annexation, municipalities are encour-
48. MIN. GEN. STAT. § 1800 et seq. (1913).
49. State ex rel. Smith v. Village of Gilbert, 127 Minn. 452, 149
N.W. 951 (1914).
50. MUNN. STAT. § 414.041 (1971).
51. State v. City of White Bear Lake, 255 Minn. 28, 95 N.W.2d 294
(1959).
52. Id. at 37, 95 N.W.2d at 301.
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aged to make full use of their current territorial resources before
ingesting another bite of rural hinterland.
The creation of the Minnesota Municipal Commission
(MVIMC), 5 3 which serves as an administrative overseer of most
municipal boundary changes within Minnesota, is further evi-
dence of a state policy favoring orderly and controlled growth.
In establishing -the Commission, the legislature announced that
"sound urban development is essential to the continued economic
growth of this state" and enpowered the Commission "to pro-
mote and regulate development of municipalities so that the
public interest in efficient local government will be properly rec-
ognized and served."54
In the usual annexation project, those seeking a boundary
change desire immediate action. Minnesota has recently enacted
a statute allowing for a process termed "orderly annexation,"
which permits the MMC to set aside designated territory for fu-
ture annexation to a municipality until such time as the annexing
entity is found to be willing and prepared to furnish urban serv-
ices and the territory to 'be annexed is or is about to become ur-
ban or suburban in nature.65 When these conditions are met, the
Commission may allow annexation. After annexation, the taxes
in the annexed territory increase over a period of three to five
years to the same rate as that of the annexing unit. As the MMC
has said, "[t]his procedure allows the village to plan today to
service the growth that everyone concedes will take place while
not annexing any land until that growth actually does occur."5 6
Minnesota has also expressed support of an orderly munici-
pal growth process by enacting a statute that empowers any
municipality outside Ramsey and Hennepin counties to divide
itself into urban and rural service districts for taxation pur-
poses.57 By allowing differential taxes according to an area's
predominant nature, the pressures caused by assessment of ur-
ban level taxes in a non-urban area can be somewhat reduced.
2. Recent State Legislation
The Critical Areas Act5" is one of the most recent expres-
53. MnN. STAT. § 414.01 (1971).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 414.032.
56. MnisoTA MumtcnAL CoMzissIoN, FoREsT LAKE MrmoRAN-
Dum 3 (Dec. 21, 1972).
57. MNN. STAT. § 272.67 (1971).
58. Mm . STAT. § 116G.01 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
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sions of concern with a policy of state direction and control of
growth. The Act's policy statement reflects an awareness that
uncontrolled development may have irreversibly damaging ef-
fects upon certain areas of the state classified as "areas of criti-
cal concern." Under the Act, the Minnesota Environmental
Quality Council (EQC)59 can recommend the designation of criti-
cal areas to the governor. The governor can then establish the
area as a "critical area" by an order which delineates the bound-
aries of the area, the reasons for its establishment, and the stand-
ards and guidelines for area regulation.
Local jurisdictions must submit their present plans for these
areas for review by the regional council which, in turn, makes
recommendations to the EQC. If a locality fails to make plans
which conform to the regional plan, the EQC can formulate le-
gally binding regulations for the area. Once the plan is in ef-
fect, no development can take place within the area except in
accord with the regulations. The Act provides for the establish-
ment of regional standards, regional review, and regional imple-
mentation should localities fail to conform their plans to the
standards. It demonstrates a legislative awareness of the im-
portance of regional planning for, and control of, critical regional
problems. It is only a short step from this to regional planning
and control of the timing and sequence of development.
Several other acts demonstrate the legislative awareness of
interjurisdictional problems and the necessity for comprehensive
regulation. The Minnesota Fiscal Disparity Law, 0  which distrib-
utes a portion of the total increase in assessed value of commer-
cial-industrial property in the metropolitan region to all the com-
munities in the area so that no municipality gets the full tax
benefits of new development within its boundaries, is not a tim-
ing device in itself but is integrally related to the concept of
staged growth. It reinforces the orderly, economic extension of
service into areas by removing the incentive for growth speci-
fically for the sake of increasing the local tax base. It permits
decisions regarding development in the region to be made by con-
sidering the best use of the land rather than simply the use of
the land which would generate the most tax revenue. Although
the law was challenged as violative of the Minnesota Constitu-
tion, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that it is valid.0 1
59. MINN. STAT. § 116C.01 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
60. MINN. STAT. § 473F.01 (1971).
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The Flood Plain Management Act 2 creates a state commis-
sion with authority to coordinate state, local and federal activi-
ties with regard to flood plains. Local ordinances must be re-
viewed for conformity and a failure of local initiative can be
rectified by the commission. Similarly, the Shorelands Develop-
ment in Municipalities Act 3 establishes a commission which
promulgates model standards for land use within a designated
distance of lakes, ponds and flowage. Local plans must be in com-
pliance or face change by the commission.64 A final example
is afforded by the Metropolitan Airports Commission, which has
vertical and horizontal zoning authority to regulate land use in-
tensity around airports. Though not extensive in scope, the au-
thority is commensurate with the range of the problems, and
not political boundaries.6 5
It seems abundantly clear that authorization of regional
growth controls, particularly for the timing and sequence of de-
velopment, would be compatible with both the developing trend
of Minnesota law and policy and the continued responsibility
of local units of government to implement that policy through
the necessary ordinances. 6
IV. POLICE POWER REGULATION-THE
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
There are 'two ways in which a state may control the use
of land within its borders. First, it may use eminent domain
to purchase land or interests in land. Second, it may regulate,
that is, exercise its plenary power over matters relating to the
public health, safety and general welfare. The power to regu-
late was initially vested in the state legislatures, but has, to a
61. In a four-three decision, the court held that the law was not in
contravention of Art. 9, § 1 of the Minnesota Constitution. Village of
Burnsville v. Dakota County, No. 44253 (Sep. 13, 1974).
62. AMNx. STAT. § 104.01 et seq. (Supp. 1970).
63. MNN. STAT. §§ 105.485(2), (3), 462.357(1) (Supp. 1973).
64. The act is basically similar to that sustained in Just v. Mari-
nette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
65. The act, MiNN. STAT. § 360.101 et seq. (1971), was sustained
in Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Comm'n v. McCabe, 271
Minn. 21, 135 N.W.2d 48 (1965).
66. See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d
515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962). The inherent nature
of the power was recognized by the tenth amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States and reserved to the states.
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considerable extent, been delegated to local political units by
means of enabling legislation and home rule provisions.0 7 Regu-
lation has been the work horse of past efforts at land use and
growth control, and is likely to remain so in the future regard-
less of the regulatory unit since it can be used in a pervasive
manner and without the necessity of compensating the regu-
lated parties. 8 Thus, the success of growth control may ul-
timately depend on the judicial response to the particular tech-
niques of regulation. The basic test for determining constitu-
tional limitations on the police power was expressed in Lawton
v. Steele: 9 a valid exercise of the police power must be a rea-
sonable means to a legitimate end. This test, in various forms,
is used in virtually every case in which the issue of police power
validity is raised.
A. THE LEGITIATE END
The legitimacy of the objective of regulation operates, in
the first instance, as a threshold test. If a reviewing court finds
the objective to be legitimate in some sense, it then examines
the reasonableness of the means. In this subsequent examina-
tion, the legitimacy of the objective again is examined, although
this time in a qualitative rather than a threshold sense.
There have been a number of attempts to formulate a defin-
itive test for legitimate objectives of the police power. 70 One
test states that the police power can be used to regulate activities
threatening harm to the public health, safety or general wel-
fare.71 Another provides that the state may control a use's
67. Reps, Public Land, Urban Development Policy, and the Ameri-
can Planning Tradition, in MODERNIZING URBAN LAND POLICY 15 (M.
Clawson ed. 1973).
68. No compensation is required if the regulation is valid. Binder,
supra note 41; F. BOSSELmAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING Issu
(1973). The early developers of zoning in New York City were con-
scious of the possibility of utilizing zoning by condemnation, but se-
lected the police power approach primarily because of the real-politic
of economics. See S. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN (1969). The use of zoning
by condemnation is recognized as valid by the courts. State ex rel.
Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 176 N.W. 159
(1920), affd in part, Berry v. Houghton, 273 U.S. 671 (1927); Kansas
City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969).
69. 152 U.S. 133 (1894). The decision was reaffirmed in Goldblatt
v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
70. F. BOSSELmAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, supra note 68.




harmful externalities,72 while a third permits the police power
to be used to resolve conflicts within the private sector.73 A
final test states that regulation may be used to meet the specific
needs generated by new uses.74 Certain objectives, measured
by any of the above tests, are not legitimate ends of the police
power. Thus it is invalid to use governmental powers for private
benefit, even with compensation,75 or to promote the proprietary
as opposed to the governmental interests of an exercising body
without compensation. Finally, it is often stated that un-
compensated police power regulation cannot be used for achiev-
ing a positive public benefit, as opposed to preventing a harm.77
The overall concept of growth control is difficult to cate-
gorize, primarily because it encompasses a diverse number of
objectives. Some of the ends sought are clearly those of pre-
venting harm to the public health and safety: pollution con-
trol, adequate municipal facilities, and control of the develop-
ment of environmentally critical areas such as flood plains and
unstable hillsides. However, a great number of the objectives
are not related to health and safety, ,but only to the residual
concept of general welfare, such as the preservation of land re-
sources and land character, and the promotion of more efficient
and socially balanced use of land. These objectives, depending
upon the circumstances and the jurisdiction, may or may not
shade into the area of public benefit where compensation is nec-
essary for control.78 The national trend reflects a widening
view of general welfare and regulable harms, at least where the
protection of the environment is concerned. Thus, courts may
be willing to view a state of natural environmental balance as
a desirable end rather than as a prelude 'to development,79 and
to hold that the changing of the natural state is a harm that
72. Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58
COLu. L. REv. 650, 669 (1958).
73. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 67 (1964).
74. Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 3.
75. Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent
Domain, 20 B.U.L. REv. 615 (1940); Comment, The Public Use Limitation
on Eminent Domain: An, Advance Requiem, 58 Ymxn L.J. 599 (1949);
Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959).
76. Sax, supra note 73.
77. See, e.g., Pioneer Trust and Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount
Prospect, 22 Il. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
78. CiTIzENs' ADVISORY Coimw=E ox ENvmoNmNTAL QuALrTy,
TASK FORCE ON LAND USE AND URBAN GROWTH, LAND USE AND URIBAN
GROWTH 23-24 (1973).
79. Morris County Land Dev. Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy
Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
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can be regulated under the police power without compensa-
tion. 0 In addition, there may be an increasing tendency to give
legislative declarations of necessity and purpose with regard to
environmental regulations a presumption of validity.81
Minnesota zoning and planning enabling legislation dele-
gates power to various local political units to regulate the or-
derly provision of public facilities and the distribution of popu-
lation.82 Thus, growth control should not be invalid or ultra vires
as a threshold objective under the law. Minnesota case law also
reflects the general rules on the legitimacy of police power ob-
jectives. The police power may not be used to promote purely
private interests.83 In addition, the police power cannot be used
to secure benefits, even if public in nature; such action requires
the use of eminent domain.84 Thus, the limits to the constitu-
tionality of regulation designed to control the distribution of
population and the location and timing of development remains
unclear.
Proponents of land use controls in Minnesota, as well as
nationally, must argue that the preservation of land, resources,
and environment is not the securing of benefits that require
compensation. Rather, it is the prevention of harm to the pub-
lic welfare, an objective that can be accomplished without the
use of eminent domain. The Minnesota Supreme Court recently
has indicated that it is in accord with the national tendency
to grant measures to preserve the ecology a higher priority than
in the past by holding that the controlling of sewage and air
and water pollution is one of the most important functions of
government.8 5
In summation, it is clear that growth control is not intended
to promote private interests, and it is strongly arguable that
growth control regulation is not an illegal substitute for eminent
domain. A comprehensive growth control plan attempts to pre-
vent the manifold harms that accompany unplanned or uncon-
trolled growth: land waste, resource destruction, economic
80. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
81. Turnpike Realty Corp. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891(Mass. 1972); see generally State v. Target Stores, Inc., 279 Minn. 447,
156 N.W.2d 908 (1968).
82. MINN. STAT. § 462.357 (Supp. 1973).
83. Pearce v. Village of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 118 N.W.2d 659
(1962).
84. Sanderson v. Willmar, 282 Minn. 1, 162 N.W.2d 494 (1968).
85. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency v. Hatfield, 294 Minn. 260,
200 N.W.2d 572 (1972).
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waste, and socio-economic and use imbalance. To call such fac-
tors the urban norm and their absence a benefit requiring com-
pensation is perverse.86
B. REASONABLmESS OF IEAS
If the regulation passes the hurdle of the legitimacy of the
objective, it is still necessary to consider the reasonableness of
the particular means chosen. This examination may focus on
any of several elements: the legitimacy of the legislative classi-
fications, the relation of the means to the objective, the alterna-
tives available, and the impact of regulation on the affected par-
ties as compared to the significance of the objective sought.
1. Legitimacy of the Legislative Classifications
This is essentially an issue of equal protection. It is usu-
ally stated that a valid legislative classification must not single
out persons or groups for special benefits or burdens.8 Rather,
the classification must include all those similarly situated, must
treat objects differently only if legitimate distinctions warrant
such treatment, and must neither over- nor under-classify8M As
in other areas the legislature may exercise a considerable amount
of discretion in formulating the classes. A valid legislative classi-
fication may not contain "suspect" criteria, whether these are
stated in its terms or apparent in its effect. Thus an ordinance
which imposes a burden on race, either specifically or because
of its impact, is probably invalid.80 The existence of suspect cri-
teria triggers a judicial "strict scrutiny" test, whereby the usual
presumption of legislative validity is not applicable, and the state
is forced to demonstrate both a compelling state interest and
an absence of viable alternatives.90 Poverty is not a suspect
86. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.
2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
87. Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack,
23 N.Y.2d 424, 244 N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969); Vernon Park Re-
alty, Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954).
88. Ronda Realty Corp. v. Lawton, 414 Ill. 313, 111 N.E.2d 310(1953); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
89. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
90. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (race, religion, na-
tional origin, and denial of certain fundamental interests such as the
right to vote or to travel interstate can trigger the strict scrutiny test).
Several Michigan intermediate appellate court decisions have utilized
the strict scrutiny test for land use regulation having any potential exclu-
sionary effect. See Sager, Exclusionary Zoning: Constitutional Limita-
tions on the Power of Municipalities to Restore the Use of Land, 1972
LAND UsE CONTROLS ANNuAL 153.
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criterion per se,91 but many courts show hostility to land use
ordinances whose effect is the exclusion of the pdor.0 2 This is
extremely important with respect to growth control plans, since
if a scheme which substantially restricts the use of certain lands
falls with differential impact along lines of wealth or race, "
it may prompt a more rigorous examination by the reviewing
coufrts.9 4 However, the most recent cases on growth control in-
dicate that differential impact along lines of wealth will not re-
sult in invalidation if the land regulated is located in rural areas
well outside regions of urban concentration, 5 or if the exclusion
of poor from one area or unit is anticipated and countered by
91. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 18-29 (1973); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
92. Sisters of Providence v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396
(N.D. Ill. 1971); In re Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765
(1970); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 119 N.J. Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465 (1972).
93. Thus various types of exclusionary ordinances have been held
invalid by the courts. Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp.
908 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (exclusion of non-family units); Kennedy Park
Homes, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
463 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (historical
exclusion of race); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison,
117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (1971) (excessive minimum floor space
requirement); Molino v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Glassboro,
116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (1971) (restrictions on bedrooms); In
re Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 762 (1970) (excessive
minimum lot size); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970)
(exclusion of multiple family units).
94. Timing and sequential growth controls have been put to such
a rigorous test. In Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 375, 378,
285 N.E.2d 291, 300, 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 149, 152, appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 1003 (1972), the court stated:
There is, then, something inherently suspect in a scheme
which, apart from its professed purposes, effects a restriction
upon the free mobility of a people until sometime in the future
when projected facilities are available to meet increased de-
mands....
What we will not countenance, then, under any guise, is
community efforts at immunization or exclusion. But, far from
being exclusionary, the present amendments merely seek, by
the implementation of sequential development and timed
growth, to provide a balanced cohesive community dedicated
to the effective utilization of land (emphasis added).
But see Construction Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma,
375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974), which held that a numerical limitation
on the number of available building permits in the city of Petaluma
was an unconstitutional interference with the fundamental right to travel
interstate.




provisions in the area or regional plan for low and moderate
income housing elsewhere. 8 Thus if the overall growth control
plan takes account of poverty and the need for low and mod-
erate income housing, the exclusion of the poor from particular
areas will not necessarily be fatal.
The relation of the means to the end is also considered in
evaluating the reasonableness of the legislative classification.
Wide-ranging measures taken to alleviate minor or localized
problems will be viewed with suspicion by a reviewing court.
If the variations between the scope of the objective and the ef-
fective scope of 'the means is substantial, the legislation may
be invalid. This particular test has been helpful in regional
growth control plans as the courts seem willing to recognize that
a regional regulatory plan is reasonably related in scope to the
solution of area-wide problems. 7
The Minnesota law on classification follows the national pat-
tern. Classifications cannot be drawn arbitrarily and must in-
clude those similarly situated;98 there must be genuine distinc-
tions between classes and the classification must be relevant to
the end sought. 9 Minnesota has little case law on exclusionary
zoning and thus has not developed a position with regard to
differential impact on the poor. However, if a true regional
comprehensive plan is in use, this impact should be minimal.
2. Impact of Regulation Versus the Importance of the State
Interest
The validity of a regulation may be attacked in two ways.
First, a general constitutional attack may be made focusing on
the legitimacy of the end and the reasonableness of the relation
of the means to the end. Such attacks are generally unsuccess-
ful since the courts ordinarily will defer to legislative discretion
in this area whenever possible. 0 0 Second, an individual land-
96. Nopro Co. v. Town of Cherry Hills Village, 504 P.2d 344 (Colo.
1972); Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.
2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
97. Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation
and Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970).
98. Golden v. City of St. Louis Park, 266 Minn. 46, 122 N.W.2d
570 (1963); Pearce v. Village of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 118 N.W.2d 659
(1962).
99. Schwartz v. Talmo, 205 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1973); Arcadia Dev.
Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 267 Minn. 221, 125 N.W.2d 846 (1964).
100. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Corp., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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owner may claim the regulation is invalid as to his land.' 10 In
such a case the court balances the impact of the regulation on
the landowner against the significance of the state's objective.102
The individual is more likely to succeed with this specific consti-
tutional attack, since the court may give relief and still leave the
ordinance intact. In addition, impact is not considered a matter
to be left to legislative discretion. 0 3  In assessing the impact
of regulation with regard to the importance of the state's objec-
tive, the courts use the taking clause of the fifth amendment and
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment almost inter-
changeably. Both clauses contemplate a balancing process to
determine where legitimate regulation ends and where taking
without compensation begins. 04
There are a variety of factors that make up an evaluation
of impact. None of them can be deemed the critical determi-
nant as an abstract proposition. Rather all of them can be rele-
vant and in a given case any one might be the dominant consid-
eration. The diminution of a plot's market value as a direct re-
sult of regulation is a commonly asserted indication of impact.'05
Courts will frequently state that diminution, if clearly estab-
lished, 06 is a relevant but not conclusive consideration; this ob-
servation may be appropriate with regard to most factors weighed
in the balancing process. Another important consideration in
evaluating impact is whether the regulated land has any rea-
sonable economic uses remaining. 0 7 However, even if the per-
101. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Fulling v.
Palumbo, 21 N.Y.2d 30, 233 N.E.2d 272, 286 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1967); Arverne
Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
102. The balancing process need not occur only in challenges to spe-
cific constitutionality. It may also be used in challenges to general con-
stitutionality when the court weighs the interests and impacts evident
on the face of the legislation.
103. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). Cf. Badler,
Municipal Zoning Liability in Damages-A New Cause of Action, 5 URD.
LAw. 25 (1973).
104. In another sense, the balancing process determines where the
means become unreasonable and an objective is achievable only through
condemnation. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
105. Id.; Peacock v. Board of Supervisors, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77
Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969).
106. Unsupported assertions carry little weight. Goldblatt v. Town
of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); McCarthy v. Manhattan Beach, 41
Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953).
107. Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d
587 (1938). One is not entitled to the "highest and best" use of
a particular piece of land-only a reasonable use. Fulling v. Pa-
lumbo, 21 N.Y.2d 30, 233 N.E.2d 272, 286 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1967).
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mitted uses are economical, the ordinance may be deemed an
invalid attempt to avoid eminent domain if it permits only uses
which are calculated to benefit the public. 0 3 The duration of
the restriction also can be relevant; temporary restrictions of rea-
sonable, ascertainable duration will not be deemed to be as oner-
ous as permanent ones and may be thus sustained without the
necessity of compensation.10 9
The nature of the regulated interest or use can have an im-
portant bearing on the legitimacy of regulation. If the owner
has no recognized property right, then the regulation cannot be
deemed to have produced an impact. For example, one cannot
have a protected interest in a nuisance, and the police power can
destroy such nuisance without the necessity of compensation.' 10
There are no compensable rights in the government's naviga-
tion servitude"1 or in the public trust."22 On the other hand, if
the owner's use is of high social utility, then the impact of regu-
lation may be deemed greater for purposes of balancing. 13 Ad-
ditional uses of the property, tax relief, compensation, and the
transfer of development rights all might serve to mitigate the
severity of the impact on an individual landowner." 4 These will
be discussed in some depth below.
As courts become more aware of the widespread effects of
exclusionary zoning,11 5 there will be an increased consideration
of impact not only in terms of the regulated land owner, but also
in terms of unnamed third persons who might be excluded by
108. Baker v. Planning Board of Farmingham, 353 Mass. 141, 228
N.E.2d 831 (1967); Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y.
493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954).
109. Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972);
Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
110. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394 (1915).
111. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956);
United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
112. State ex Tel Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
The case of Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761
(1972), held that no one has a compensable right to change the natural
condition of land when to do so would tend to harm the public trust.
113. Lyon Sand and Gravel Co. v. Township of Oakland, 33 Mich.
App. 614, 190 N.W.2d 354 (1971) (gravel needed for road construction
and building).
114. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
115. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Pro-
tection and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969).
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means of regulation." 6 However, an exclusionary effect may
not be considered of major significance if it concerns only a spe-
cific area removed from metropolitan pressures,'" or if it is
counterbalanced by provisions of an overall regional plan. 1 8
As noted, a threshhold determination of the fundamental
legitimacy of the state interest 1' 9 is made in evaluating the valid-
ity of a regulation. Assuming basic legitimacy, the state interest
is thereafter measured in substance, and balanced against the
impact of the regulation. For the regulation to be valid the state
interest must be sufficient, in a qualitative or quantitative sense,
to warrant the impact. Such a determination is again made us-
ing a multi-factor approach, with a number of relevant but not
necessarily conclusive considerations.
Since the prevention of harm to an aspect of the public
health, safety or general welfare is often said to be a legitimate
state objective of the police power, it is relevant to deter-
mine the likelihood and magnitude of the harm and the immedi-
acy of the threat. The likelihood that a harm will occur de-
pends to a large extent on both the regulated use's propensity
for harmful externalities and the nature of the area where the
use is located. Magnitude, in turn, may be a function of both
the inherent severity of the harm and the scope of its potential
impact; 20 if the harm threatened is death or serious bodily in-
jury to a substantial number of persons, the state's interest in
preventing it is obviously higher than if the threat is only to the
property of a few isolated landowners.' 21 Whether a use with
given tendencies presents an immediate threat often depends on
the topography, demography, climate, and degree of urbanization
of the area involved.1 22
116. Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208
(8th Cir. 1972); In re Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765
(1970); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
117. Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1972).
118. Nopro Co. v. Town of Cherry Hills Village, 504 P.2d 344 (Colo.
1972).
119. "State interest" is used to indicate the governmental interest
advanced by regulation. It may also be the interest of the municipality,
county or regional authority, as delegatees of the state's police power.
120. The wider the range of the public protected, the stronger the
public interest. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136-39 (1894).
121. Vartelas v. Water Resource Comm'n, 146 Conn. 650, 153 A.2d
822 (1959).
122. Dooley v. Fairfield, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964); Exton
Quarries, Inc. v. West Whiteland, 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967).
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The general welfare encompasses a wide range of public in-
terests which can be protected from harm by the police power;
however, not all of these interests are weighted equally in the
balancing process. Rather, there are qualitative differences that
may affect the ultimate validity of the regulation. Some inter-
ests are simply deemed less substantial in public importance and
so will sustain less of an uncompensated impact. The objective
of preventing a harm to the public health or safety is accorded
the highest priority. Regulations to prevent such harm will jus-
tify -a high degree of uncompensated impact, especially if the
threat is likely and of substantial magnitude.123
On the other hand, objectives relating to aesthetics, histori-
cal considerations, and area character are all deemed legiti-
mate,12 4 but of such a nature as to support only a minimal level
of impact.125 Economic welfare, planned growth, and efficient
service provision are deemed objectives of a slightly higher pri-
ority, and regulations designed to implement these objectives
(and prevent the harm occasioned by their absence) will support
a greater amount of uncompensated impact. -1 2 0 Furthermore,
there is a definite trend to accord the general welfare objective
of preventing ecological or environmental harm a priority as
high as that given the objectives of health and safety. 2 7
Minnesota case law on the assessment of impact and the
balance of. impact against state interest is basically in accord
with the national pattern. However, the court has only dis-
cussed limited aspects of the problem, so that it is not possible
to find precedents in all areas. The Minnesota approach to de-
123. Vartelas v. Water Resource Comm'n, 146 Conn. 650, 153 A.2d
822 (1959); Salamar Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221, 275 N.E.2d
585, 325 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1971).
124. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); SVmposium-Historic
Preservation, 38 LAW & CONTMrp. PROB. 309 (1973).
125. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597
(1967).
126. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972); State ex rel. Miller
v. Manders, 2 Wis. 2d 365, 86 N.W.2d 469 (1957).
127. Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 93 (1972); Turnpike Realty Co., Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 284
N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 1972); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201
N.W.2d 761 (1972); U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVmrONMENTAL QUALrrY, Foumm
ANNuAL REPORT 121-53 (1973). However, courts are still reluctant to
recognize a constitutional right to the enjoyment of an untouched envi-
ronment. Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn.) aff'd 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
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termining the validity of regulation involves the use of a multi-
faceted approach to determine if it is a reasonable means to a
legitimate end. Although a particular determination may often
seem to focus on a single variable, this focusing merely means
that the element was the most critical factor in that case. The
court has given considerable weight to a substantial diminution
of market value in determining impact and validity,128 but such
a determination is not conclusive. 12 9 In addition, the court has
indicated that to be valid, a regulation must permit a reasonable
remaining economic use suitable to the land regulated.'30
Minnesota cases hold that the weight accorded to the state
interests will depend in part on the likelihood and severity of
the threatened harm. For example, a regulation concerning dis-
charge of water effluent was held invalid because it was based
on a mere possibility rather than a likelihood of harm; this was
not considered sufficient to justify a severe impact. 3 ' However,
the effect of the court's consideration of likelihood and severity
of impact is blunted somewhat inasmuch as the legislative dec-
laration is presumed proper and valid except in extreme cases.' -3 2
Other cases suggest that the court recognizes a hierarchy of
public purposes, and that regulations tending to promote the
public health and safety will support a greater impact than, for
example, those promoting aesthetics, although all are recognized
as legitimate objectives of the police power.133
In the following section of this Article, a growth control regu-
lation will be evaluated in the manner discussed above, as an
awareness of the evaluation process can aid in the drafting and
defense of the legislation. The importance of both proper plan-
ning and facts to support the existence of the public interest will
128. Sanderson v. Willmar, 282 Minn. 1, 162 N.W.2d 494 (1968); State
ex rel. Foster v. Minneapolis, 255 Minn. 249, 97 N.W.2d 273 (1959).
129. City of St. Paul v. Chicago, St. P., Mpls., & 0. Ry., 413 F.2d 762
(8th Cir. 1969), sustained a regulation which diminished the market
value by almost 60 percent.
130. Curry v. Young, 285 Minn. 387, 173 N.W.2d 410 (1969); Filister
v. Minneapolis, 270 Minn. 53, 133 N.W.2d 500 (1964).
131. North Suburban Sanitary Sewer Dist. v. Water Pollution Con-
trol Comm'n, 281 Minn. 524, 162 N.W.2d 249 (1968).
132. State v. Target Stores, Inc., 279 Minn. 447, 156 N.W.2d 908
(1968).
133. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281
Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968); Zumbrota v. Johnson, 280 Minn. 390,




be emphasized. 13 Techniques to reduce impact on the land own-
ers, and thus make the regulation less vulnerable to attack, will
be suggested. Throughout the section there will be a focus on
the importance of using a variety of techniques and developing
data to support the existence and weightiness of the public in-
terest involved.
V. TECHNIQUES TO ACCOMPLISH GROWTH
CONTROL OBJECTIVES
The Council's physical development framework policies are
a product of the need to coordinate the growth of five separate
geographical areas of the region, each of which differs in terms
of age, condition, type and intensity of the present development
pattern.'3 5
I. Metro Centers-Downtowns of Minneapolis and St. Paul
IT. Central City and Older Suburban Areas
III. Areas of Active Urbanization
IV. Rural Areas
V. Free Standing Cities and Villages
134. Note the statement in F. Bossymm , D. CALEs & J. BANTA,
THE TARING Issue 290 (1973):
The importance of a sound factual presentation is apparent in
the urban context as well. The town of Ramapo, on the out-
skirts of the New York Metropolitan area, successfully defended
a growth control ordinance before New York's highest court
with success due in no small part to a thorough presentation
of their case...
The town was able to present a vast array of planning data
in their defense. In its statement of the facts in Golden v.
Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo, .. . the Court of Ap-
peals pointed to the Town Master Plan, whose "preparation in-
cluded a four volume study of the existing land uses, public
facilities, transportation, industry and commerce, housing needs,
and projected population trends.... Additional sewage dis-
trict and drainage studies were undertaken which culminated
in the adoption of a Capital Budget.. ." Thus not only could
the town rely upon a large number of formal municipal actions,
adoption of a Master Plan, a Capital Budget, zoning and subdi-
vision ordinances and the like, but they could also document
each with thorough and detailed planning studies.
135. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
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Illusfration of Planning Areas13
136. Although concentric growth is shown in the illustration in the
text, it should not be thought of as a mandated form of regional plan-
ning. The five tiers can be utilized with any physical plan form. For
example, the "radial corridor" plan of the Washington, D.C., area, se-
lected to provide concentrated development, maximum prospect for
mass transit, and critical open space close in to the urban core, can
be just as easily represented:
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The pursuit of the Council's objectives for these areas will
require the balanced utilization of regulatory, compensatory and
taxation techniquues across all levels of government in the re-
gion as well as within each particular planning area. The imple-
mentation of a rational growth control plan for the region will
involve a number of major techniques, including short term con-
See Mmno TOPA WASHINGTON CouNcIL or GOVEmNMENTS, Ts CaNG-
InG REGION: A CovwA.msoN oF PLAxNs AN PoracIEs wrra DEVLOPMNmT
T~aNDs (1969).
A second example is the Kansas City metropolitan region's "metro-
center" plan, which was developed to accommodate a lower density re-
gion with greater reliance on freeway and automobile transportation,
with regional centers located at points where the major east-west and
north-south freeways cross the outer bypass freeway.
Kansas City Metropolitan Region
See Metropolitan Planning Commission-Kansas City Region, Sketch
Plan-1990 (Doc. P-4, Dec. 1968). The intersecting freeways are 1-70
(east-west), 1-35 (northeast-southwest), 1-29 nd U.S. 71.
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trols, long term controls for gradual urbanization, long term
controls for preservation of open space and rural areas, and per-
manent controls. 13 7
A. SHORT TERI CONTROLS: PROTECTING THE PLANNING
AND CAPITAL BUDGETING PROCESSES
1. Interim Development Controls
In order for a community to effectively and efficiently ac-
complish the task of regional growth guidance, it is essential
that a comprehensive planning process be properly utilized.
Only as a result of intelligent planning, including the adoption
of specific goals 'and means for community development, capital
facility formation, population density control, and social and
economic balance, can a community effectively employ regula-
tory tools to deal with its myriad land use problems. Legal de-
vices by which this important planning process can be encour-
aged and protected must be recognized -and implemented. In-
terim development controls are an historically significant de-
vice which can be helpful in facilitating this process. 13 8 In par-
ticular, large scale planning and regulation require some form
of interim development control for maximum efficacy.
To establish interim controls, a temporary ordinance or reg-
ulation is enacted which prevents further development until the
planning process has been completed and permanent controls to
implement the plan have been developed. This ordinance serves
three functions: first, it protects the plan during the formulation
and implementation stages, and even during the continuous plan-
ning process which must follow if the land use system is to re-
main viable and flexible; 139 second, it prevents the creation of
non-conforming uses during the planning process 140 (this is par-
137. Freilich, Development Timing, Moratoria and Controlling
Growth, 4 INST. ON PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN 147 (1974).
138. D. HEETER, INTERIM ZONING ORDINANCES 8 (ASPO, Planning
Advisory Service Report No. 242, 1969); Freilich, Interim Development
Controls: Essential Tools for Implementing Flexible Planning and Zon-
ing, 49 J. URB. L. 65 (1971); Comment, Stop-Gap and Interim Legisla-
tion: A Device to Maintain the Status Quo of an Area Pending the Adop-
tion of a Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance or Amendment Thereto, 18
SYRACUSE L. REV. 837 (1967).
139. United States v. City of Chester, 144 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1944);
Tim v. City of Long Branch, 135 N.J.L. 549, 53 A.2d 164 (1947).
140. Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st
Cir. 1972); Downham v. City Council, 58 F.2d 784 (E.D. Va. 1932); Mon-
mouth Lumber Co. v. Ocean Twp., 9 N.J. 64, 87 A.2d 9 (1952).
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ticularly important for preservation of Planning Areas III and
IV); and third, it permits public debate and citizen participation
during the formulation and public hearing stages of the plan.1 4 1
However, formal ordinances are not always necessary. Informal
techniques of administrative processing may be substituted, rely-
ing on the principle of administrative law which prohibits an ad-
ministrative officer from granting a permit in violation of a
proposed law implementing planning. 4 2 While interim develop-
ment controls have been used primarily by counties and muni-
cipalities, they are also being used successfully at the state and
regional level through legislation to protect areas during the pe-
riod within which a plan for preservation is being formulated.14 3
For example, in New Jersey interim controls were used by the
141. If the legislative body is unable to protect the area against the
establishment of non-conforming uses during the planning process, it
may all too often attempt to compensate by subterfuge. It may dis-
pense with public discussion and participation, and enact the new plan
and implementing ordinances as swiftly and silently as possible-avoid-
ing any announcements which might spur a "race of diligence" among
developers who will attempt to vest their rights before the impending
legislative change. F. CAmPIx, URBAN LAND USE PLANNING 98 (2d ed.
1965).
The expression "race of diligence" was made famous in the leading
case of Downham v. City Council, 58 F.2d 784, 788 (E.D. Va. 1932).
See also Roselle v. Moonachie, 49 N.J. Super. 35, 139 A.2d 42 (1958) and
Hasco Elec. Corp. v. Dassler, 143 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct. 1955), in which
"a race of technical advantage between the individual and the commu-
nity representatives" is described. The extent and nature of the rush for
building permits to acquire vested rights before the adoption of perma-
nent controls making the proposed use nonconforming should never be
overlooked or underestimated, particularly in a major metropolitan re-
gion. In one borough of the city of New York alone, the pendency
of the new Building Zone Amended Resolution of the City of New York,
which became effective on December 15, 1961, resulted in an increase
in applications for construction of apartment house buildings from 364
buildings costing $441,900,000 in 1960 to 1,266 buildings costing $1,560,-
000,000 in 1961. C. RATHKOPF, TAE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 57-
84 (Supp. 1965). See also J. M=rLENBAum, THE LAw OF ZONING 1703
(2d ed. 1955).
142. Russian Hill Improvement Ass'n v. Board of Appeals, 66 Cal. 2d
34, 423 P.2d 824, 56 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1967); Hunter v. Adams, 180 Cal.
App. 2d 510, 4 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1960); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Vil-
lage of Palatine, 22 Ill. App. 2d 264, 160 N.E.2d 697 (1959); A.J. Aber-
man, Inc. v. City of New Kensington, 377 Pa. 520, 105 A.2d 586 (1954).
143. In California these controls have been used by the Coastal
Zone Commission, the San Francisco Bay Area Conservation Agency
and the Lake Tahoe Conservation Agency. In New York the Hudson
River Valley and the Adirondack State Park Commissions have relied
on interim controls. See Summary of State Land Use Controls, LAND
USE PLANNING REPoRTs, Spec. Rep. No. 1, Sep., 1973, at 4-5, 20.
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Hackensack-Meadowland region, consisting of 13 municipalities,
while a comprehensive plan was being prepared. 14 4
In testing the validity of interim controls, the threshold re-
quirement is that the implementing body have legislative author-
ization to impose such restrictions. Most state courts have found
such authorization in home rule provisions or the standard zon-
ing enabling acts, or have relied on the implied authority to
reasonably exercise police power to protect statutory planning
processes.' 4 5 Assuming legislative authorization, the validity of
the controls depends on the reasonableness of the approach used.
The impact on landowners can be minimized and validity assured
if several elements are present in the regulation: the ordinance
should be reasonably limited as to time,14 0 the freeze should not
prevent total development in the entire community, and there
should be a variance procedure for those suffering unnecessary
hardship.147 Controls which protect Planning Areas III and IV
during the planning process, while leaving development free in
Planning Areas I, II and V, soundly meet all of the above objec-
tives. It should be noted that most so-called "stop-growth" or
"freeze-growth" ordinances now in use around the country are
really short-term interim development controls in the guise of
developmental moratoria.' 48
2. Minnesota Law on Interim Controls
Minnesota municipalities do not have specific statutory en-
abling authority to enact interim controls pending rezoning,
while counties have specific authority for one year interim con-
trols if there is an impending plan or annexation.' 49 Municipali-
ties have, however, attempted to use their general delegation
of zoning and home rule power to enact hold orders, with little
success. The Minnesota Supreme Court struck down one such
144. Meadowland Regional Dev. Agency v. Hackensack Meadow-
lands Dev. Comm'n, 119 N.J. Super. 572, 293 A.2d 192 (1972); see also
Deal Gardens, Inc. v. Loch Arbour, 48 N.J. 492, 226 A.2d 607 (1967).
145. Freilich, supra note 138.
146. Ordinances have been sustained for periods as long as 31
months, Campana v. Clark, 82 N.J. Super. 392, 197 A.2d 711 (1964). If
they extend beyond a reasonable period they may be held to be takings
without compensation. Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App.
2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969).
147. Rubin v. McAlevey, 54 Misc. 2d 338, 282 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1967),
aff'd, 29 App. Div. 2d 874, 288 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1968).
148. See LAND USE PLANNING REPoRTS, Oct. 22, 1973, at 7.
149. MINN. STAT. § 394.34 (1971).
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attempt, stating that there was no authority under the enabling
act to suspend zoning ordinances .by hold orders, the order was
indefinite as to duration, and the subsequently-passed ordinance
restricting the use of a particular piece of property operated as
a taking without compensation.150 Following this decision it was
hypothesized that a more limited hold order might be upheld as
within a municipality's implied powers,151 but in 1966 the Minne-
sota Supreme Court held that an interim ordinance with a two
year duration was still invalid.152 It is noteworthy that in neither
case was the duration of the hold order limited by the terms of
the ordinance. In the light of national experience, precise limi-
tations of reasonable length together with a procedure for vari-
ances and a recognition of existing vested rights might com-
pel a judicial reconsideration of the extent of a municipality's im-
plied authority, especially if arguments on planning necessity
were well-presented.
As previously noted, interim development control can be
approximated in Minnesota by administrative controls.'5 In
Pennsylvania, where the state supreme court expressly rejected
interim controls without statutory authorization,' the same
court later accepted an ordinance authorizing the denial of build-
ing permits pending a proposed change in a zoning ordinance un-
der the administrative control theory.5 5 The same result was
reached in Illinois.15' In California, the state supreme court has
recognized both theories, stating that the techniques are inter-
changeable. 57 In this regard, Minnesota law recognizes that
150. Alexander v. Minneapolis, 267 Minn. 155, 125 N.W.2d 583
(1963). The hold order in this case had been in effect for a period
of nine years, clearly an abuse of reasonable time limitations.
151. Note, The Administration of Zoning Flexibility Devices: An
Explanation for Recent Judicial Frustration, 49 Mnw. L. Rzv. 973
(1965).
152. Ostrand v. Village of North St. Paul, 275 Minn. 440, 447 N.W.2d
571 (1966).
153. See text accompanying note 142 supra.
154. Kline v. City of Harrisburg, 362 Pa. 438, 68 A.2d 182 (1949).
155. Beverly Bldg. Corp. v. Lower Merion Twp., 409 Pa. 417, 187
A.2d 567 (1963); A.J. Aberman, Inc. v. City of New Kensington, 377
Pa. 520, 105 A.2d 586 (1954).
156. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Village of Palatine, 22 IM. App.
2d 264, 160 N.E.2d 697 (1959) (sustaining administrative controls); Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. City of Park Ridge, 16 Ill. App. 2d 555, 149 N.E.2d
344 (1958) (holding interim zoning unauthorized).
157. In upholding an administrative control ordinance denying
building permits pending a zone change to prevent creation of non-
conforming uses, the court in Russian Hill Improvement Ass'n v. Board
of Permit Appeals, 66 Cal. 2d 34, 45, 423 P.2d 824, 833, 56 Cal. Rptr.
672, 681 (1967), stated in n.24:
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building permits can be limited in duration.'r 8 Administrative
revocation is even possible if done prior to substantial construc-
tion and the acquisition of vested rights, 15D as long as there has
not been bad faith or fraud in the prevention of the vesting of
the right.160
In summation, the use of interim development controls at
the county level can be quite effective in protecting unincorpor-
ated county areas during development and implementation of re-
gional growth control plans. However, similar powers for mu-
nicipalities and for the Metropolitan Council may be essential as
well. Although it would be advisable to seek explicit enabling
legislation lbefore utilizing this technique on a regional basis, de-
cisions adverse to the implied power of municipalities to enact
intensive controls might be avoided without legislation by care-
ful drafting, reasonable limit on duration, and protection of
vested rights.
3. Short Term Environmental Moratoria
The initial failure to control the timing and location of de-
velopment plus the extension of sewer and water installations
into areas not scheduled for such capital facilities under the
comprehensive plan often result in sprawl and premature sub-
division. Capital facilities are often extended not in accord
with the plan, but in response to pollution problems created by
the initial unplanned development. The presence of such facili-
ties invites more development and the problems of unplanned
growth become cyclical.' A short-term moratorium in areas
lacking existing sewer and water facilities can be utilized to pre-
vent development. Dade County, Florida has adopted a short-
term moratorium on sewer hook-ups and building permits6 2 and
Fairfax County, Virginia, is using a sewer moratorium to prevent
issuance of building permits in excess of capacity sewage rates
The Board of Supervisors might have proceeded otherwise:
It might have chosen to adopt an "interim ordinance" to freeze
the issuance of all building permits in the northern portion of
San Francisco until the new law had become effective.
158. Kiges v. St. Paul, 240 Minn. 522, 62 N.W.2d 363 (1953).
159. State ex rel. Berndt v. Iten, 259 Minn. 77, 106 N.W.2d 366
(1960).
160. Hay v. Township of Grow, 206 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1973).
161. METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT DIscussIoN STATEMENT, supra note
10, at 20.




established by Virginia state pollution authorities. 63 Matin
County, California, and Pinellas County, Florida, have imposed
moratoria on building permits to insure that critical water sup-
plies will not be exhausted and that the use of water will proceed
in accordance with sound planning.1 0 '
A municipal authority or public utility is ordinarily under
an equal protection duty,165 and possibly a common law duty, to
provide sewer or water facilities to those willing to tender the
going rate. 6 6 Furthermore, it has been held that a short-term
environmental moratorium must be temporary and within the
limits of necessity, and must not be an attempt to place a gen-
eral community burden on the individual' 67 Present law gen-
erally permits temporary restraint, for a general environmental
problem if the community is making good faith efforts to rectify
the problem.0 s Short-term environmental moratoria may thus
163. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, Proposal for Implement-
ing an Improved Planning and Land Use Control System in Fairfax
County, Final Report 79 (as adopted for Public Hearing June 11, 1973).
164. Marin County relies upon the California Environmental Quality
Act, CAL. PuB. RES. CODE ANN. § 21000 et seq. (West Supp. 1974), and
Wilson v. Hidden Valley Municipal Water Dist., 256 Cal. App. 2d 271, 63
CaL Rptr. 889 (1967), for the principle that municipal authorities may
implement municipal growth policies which recognize the protection of
the environment as the guiding criterion in all public decisions. For an
analysis of Pinellas County's water moratorium, see M. Stierheim, Re-
source Needs and Managed Growth for Pinellas County, (Position State-
ment No. 2, presented to Board of County Commissioners of Pinellas
County, Florida, Oct. 30, 1973).
165. See Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972).
166. Reid Dev. Corp. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 10 N.J.
229, 89 A.2d 667 (1952); Crownhill Homes, Inc. v. San Antonio, 433 S.W.
2d 448 (Tex. 1968).
167. Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23
N.Y.2d 424, 244 N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969).
168. Minn. Laws 1973 ch. 422 § 12, amending MNN. STAT. ch. 473B(1971). The Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. II, 1972), now requires states to establish
strict controls and standards of water quality for intrastate waters, and
where the states fail to comply, the Federal Administrator will take over
the program. The validity of withholding permits where water and sewer
facilities are inadequate has been upheld by the courts. For examole,
in Camelot Builders, Inc. v. Board of County Supervisors (Ch. No. 38968,
Fairfax Co., Va., Cir. Ct. 1973), the court held that the county could not
legally issue building permits which would result in treatment capacity
in excess of the figure certified by the State Water Control Board:
It appears from the certificate-that control over building per-
mits is the safest and best way to prevent pollution and the
one intended by the Control Board. Therefore, I hold that the
County does have the power and the duty to refuse to issue
additional permits, if it results in violation of the certificate.(Letter Opihion, Judge Keith, July 5, 1973). Similarly, in United
States v. Douglas County, 5 E.R.C. 1577, 1582 (D. Nev. 1973), the county
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be available to supplement interim development controls and
permit the Metropolitan Council, together with the counties and
municipalities, to develop a long range capital improvement plan
which will control the timing and sequence of growth.
B. LONG TERM CONTROLS: CONTROLLING THE TIMING AND
SEQUENCE OF DEVELOPMENT IN PLANNING AREA III
1. Zoning Based on a Long Term Regional Capital Plan (The
Ramapo Model)
As discussed earlier, most municipalities and regions are
forced to react to development in rapidly urbanizing regions
with little control over where and when development takes place.
The result is sprawl, leapfrog development and a waste of land,
resources and energy.16 9 Several commentators, recognizing the
extent of these problems and the inability of most municipalities
to address them effectively, have suggested that the impetus of
sprawl might be reversed if development were made responsive
to the timed and sequential provision of public facilities. 1'7 0 This
theory was put into effect in 1969 in Ramapo, New York, a sub-
urb of New York City, which was undergoing rapid growth and
sprawl. Ramapo, which has an area of 89 square miles, ap-
proached the control of growth by first developing a comprehen-
sive plan and subsequently adopting an 18 year capital budget
and program which projected the staged and sequential provi-
sion of necessary municipal services to all areas within the town.
The zoning ordinance was then amended to provide that all resi-
was enjoined from issuing permits for construction of any new struc-
tures "until facilities for treatment and exportation of waste and sewage
from Lake Tahoe Basin have been completed and placed in operation."
New Federal Environmental Protection Agency regulations concern-
ing indirect source pollution will severely restrict scatter site and sprawl
development without adequate water and sewer facilities, see 38 Fed. Reg.
33702 (1973). See U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, FounRTi
ANNUAL REPORT 235 (1973). The effective date of the regulations is now
scheduled for January 1, 1975. See LAND USE PLANNING REPORTS, Jan. 24,
1974, at 4.
169. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972), reviews the
conclusions of major national and state commissions on the subject of
urban sprawl and scatter site development and the need for timing and
sequential controls. See also notes 12-19 supra.
170. Fagin, Regulating the Timing of Urban Development, 20 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 298 (1955); Schmandt, Municipal Control of Urban
Expansion, 29 FORD. L. REv. 637 (1961); see also J. NOBLE, A PROPOSED
SYSTEM FOR REGULATING LAND USE IN URBANIZING COUNTIES (1967);
Josephs v. Town Bd., 24 Misc. 2d 366, 198 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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dential development must proceed in accordance with the provi-
sion of adequate municipal facilities, and would be subject to the
requirement of obtaining a special permit, based upon a total of
fifteen development points from five categories: (1) public sani-
tary sewers; (2) drainage facilities related to adequate run-off
capacity at maximum development; (3) improved parks and rec-
reational facilities; (4) improved major and secondary collector
roads; and (5) fire houses within appropriate distances. Under
the ordinance the town is committed to completion of sufficient
public capital improvements to assure development of all areas
within a maximum period of eighteen years. Reduction of as-
sessed valuation is granted to reflect the temporary restrictions
placed on the use of the land. Permits are issued presently for
development at such time as the capital plan indicates the facili-
ties will be available. Development time can be accelerated by
the developer's agreement to provide the necessary facilities for
.the accumulation of the required points, and variance relief can
'be granted if the subdivision is consistent with the town's com-
prehensive planning. 71
In the 1972 case of Golden v. Planning Board of the Town of
Ramapo,172 a case already described as a zoning "classic,"'1 3
Ramapo's timing and sequential controls were upheld by the
New York Court of Appeals. The court rejected both the argu-
ment that the exercise of these powers was outside permissible
statutory authorization 7 4 and the assertion that the ordinance
171. Thus public housing and low and moderate income housing
were exempted from the provisions of the ordinance; the town had
a public housing authority which erected 200 units of bi-racial public
housing. Fletcher v. Romney, 323 F. Supp. 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Green-
wald v. Town of Ramapo, 35 App. Div. 2d 958, 317 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1970);
Farrelly v. Town of Ramapo, 35 App. Div. 2d 957, 317 N.Y.S.2d 837
(1970). This is in accord with the general proposition that uses which
afford a high degree of social utility as expressed by state policy are
entitled to a variance and separate classification from regular housing
and other uses. Abbott House v. Village of Tarrytown, 34 App. Div.
2d 821, 312 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1970); Cameron v. Zoning Agent, 357 Mass.
757, 260 N.E.2d 143 (1970); DeSimone v. Greater Englewood Housing
Corp. No. 1, 56 N.J. 428, 267 A.2d 31 (1970).
172. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dis-
missed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
173. D. HAGmAN, PUBLIC PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN AND
LAND DEVELOPAMT 386 (1973). A recent poll of the leading law profes-
sors on planning and zoning in the nation resulted in the Ramapo case's
being voted the most significant zoning case in American history since
the Euclid decision established the constitutionality of zoning in 1926.
Id. at 385-86.
174. The trend as reflected by the New York Court of Appeals deci-




What we will not countenance, then, under any guise, is com-
munity efforts at immunization or exclusion. But, far from be-
ing exclusionary, the present amendments merely seek, by the
implementation of sequential development and timed growth,
to provide a balanced cohesive community dedicated to the effi-
cient utilization of land.175
[The] obvious purpose is to prevent premature subdivision
absent essential municipal facilities and to insure continuous
development commensurate with the Town's obligation to
provide such facilities. They seek, not to freeze population
at present levels but to maximize growth by the efficient use of
land, and in so doing testify to this community's continuing
role in population assimilation.' 7
The Ramapo case is particularly significant in that it is the
first time a state supreme court has held that an uncompensated
restriction of development by means of timed and sequential
phasing is within the limits of the taking and the due process
clauses.177  The court emphasized the temporary nature of the
restrictions and the effort the town had made to mitigate the
hardship to affected landowners:
An ordinance which seeks to permanently restrict the use
of property so that it may not be used for any reasonable pur-
pose must be recognized as a taking .... An appreciably dif-
ferent situation obtains where the restriction constitutes a tem-
porary restriction, promising that the property may be put to
a profitable use within a reasonable time .... (emphasis
added). The proposed restraints, mitigated by the prospect of
appreciated value and interim reductions in assessed value, and
measured in terms of the nature and magnitude of the project
undertaken, are within the limits of necessity (emphasis
added).
In sum, where it is clear that the existing physical and fi-
nancial resources of the community are inadequate to furnish
the essential services and facilities which a substantial increase
in population requires, there is a rational basis for "phased
thorize legitimate planning objectives. See Naegele Outdoor Advertis-
ing Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968);
Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968). Min-
nesota should have no authorization problems as the state enabling act
delegates authority to regulate the distribution of population. The
Maryland Supreme Court has also conditioned the right to more inten-
sive land use on the availability of municipal facilities. Montgomery
County Council v. Leizman, 268 Md. 621, 303 A.2d 374 (1973); Norbeck
Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 254 Md. 59, 254
A.2d 700 (1969).
175. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 378, 285 N.E.2d 291, 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 152
(1972).
176. Id. at 379, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152-53.
177. Freilich, Golden v. Town of Ramapo: Establishing a New Di-
mension in American Planning Law, 4 URB. LAW. ix (1972); Note,
A Zoning Program for Phased Growth: Ramapo Township's Time
Controls on Residential Development, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 723, 758 (1972).
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growth" and henc% the challenged ordinance is not violative
of the Federal and State Constitutions.178
The principles of Ramapo may prove even more significant if
states and regions use them to develop a controlled growth policy
on the regional level that balances suburban development with
inner-city revitalization and new community development.1 70
Indeed, the court of appeals in Ramapo noted that "these [timing]
controls are typically proposed as an adjunct of regional plan-
ning. .. "18o The concept of Planning Area III, staged devel-
opment in accord with the provision of facilities under a regional
capital improvements plan, should be legally feasible under the
Ramapo rationale.
One of the key elements of the Ramapo plan was the spe-
cial permit technique. This technique creates a conditional per-
mitted use, midway between a use by right and a prohibited use.
The premise on which this technique is based is that some uses
are desirable but likely to cause difficult problems, and thus
should be subject to special control. Therefore, the use is permit-
ted if a specific showing is made that the special conditions have
been complied with. The conditions imposed cannot be arbitrary,
but rather must be specifically set out in the ordinance, espe-
cially if an administrative body passes on the permit applica-
tions.181 Minnesota recognizes the special permit technique and
provides for municipal council approval on the recommendation
of the planning commission.182 However, Minnesota law does not
permit the council complete discretion. The standards governing
the use must be listed and, if these are complied with, the permit
may not be denied. 83  If the standards are stated only in very
general form, the council can deny the permit only if the pro-
posed use is incompatible with the basic uses authorized within a
178. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 380-83, 285 N.E.2d 291, 303-05, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138,
154-56 (1972).
179. Elliott & Marcus, From Euclid to Ramapo: New Directions in
Land Development Controls, 1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 56 (1973); Note, Time
Controls on Land Use: Prophylactic Law for Planners, 57 CoRNJXL L.
REV. 827, 848 (1972).
180. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 379, 285 N.E.2d 291, 303, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 153
(1972).
181. If the legislative body passes on the applications, the standards
need not be as specific. Beiclaire Holding Corp. v. Klingher, 28 App.
Div. 689, 280 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1967); Green Point Say. Bank v. Board of
Zoning Appeals, 281 N.Y. 534, 24 N.E.2d 319 (1939).
182. The special permit technique is used for planned unit develop-
ments. See Chandler v. Kroiss, 291 Minn. 196, 190 N.W.2d 472 (1971).




particular zone and endangers the public health, safety or wel-
fare of the area affected or the community as a whole. 1s&
These limitations should pose no substantial problem for a re-
gional control scheme, as a plan based on the Ramapo model
would provide very specific, ascertainable standards which do
not depend on arbitrary or ad hoc considerations.
2. Subdivision Regulations
A primary cause of urban sprawl has been the failure to use
subdivision regulations effectively and the consequent uncon-
trolled development of land.8 5 Since the subdivision of land is
not an isolated transaction affecting only the buyer and seller,
but rather a critical factor in establishing the pattern of com-
munity growth, it is most important that some control over this
process be exercised so that growth can proceed in an orderly
and rational manner. Subdivision regulations are a tool which
can be effectively used to accomplish this task. The police power
to enact subdivision regulations exists independently from but
in conjunction with the power to zone. Both are means for im-
plementing the planning process. The Court in the Ramapo case
stated:
True other alternatives, such as requiring off-site improvements
as a pre-requisite to subdivision, may be available [for imple-
mentation of sequential development and timed growth), but the
choice as how best to proceed, in view of the difficulties attend-
ing such exactions ... cannot be faulted.18 6
The vital impact that subdivision regulations can have has been
further increased by a new approach that links the police power
controls of zoning with environmental and subdivision regula-
tions to assure that development does not prematurely or per-
manently burden the society.8 7 This approach not only empha-
sizes the internal requirements of the subdivision and its resi-
dents but also focuses on the relationship of the subdivision to
its external environment and the community's comprehensive
plan. 88
184. See generally Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 167
N.W.2d 45 (1969).
185. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN
AND RuRAL AMERICA, POLICIES FOR FuTURE GROWTH 28 (Doc. A-32, 1968).
186. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 378, 285 N.E.2d 291, 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 152
(1972).
187. Id. at 379, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152.




In their most common form, subdivision regulations are used
to regulate the installation of various necessary internal im-
provements. The standards set forth are enforced by requiring
developers to post performance bonds. Subdivision regulations
also provide a means of enforcing zoning, by establishing mini-
mum lot sizes, set-back requirements, easements, rights-of-way,
off-street parking requirements, and dedication or reservation of
certain lands. 89 It has generally been held to be within the con-
stitutional and statutory authority of the reviewing body to con-
dition plat approval on the dedication of money, land, and im-
provements that meet the needs generated by the new develop-
ment, as opposed to needs created by the general community.19 0
In the new approach to subdivision regulation, many com-
munities are now requiring that subdivision approval be de-
layed or denied where there is a fair and substantial showing
that the subdivision will cause serious off-site flooding or envi-
ronmental degradation or will increase the burden on inadequate
municipal facilities such as roads and sewers. 19 ' The validity of
these further restrictions should also be apparent. It has become
fairly well established that a planning board has a duty to pro-
tect the public in general, as well as the future owners and occu-
piers of property in a subdivision, by requiring that reasonable
conditions be met by the developer before plat approval is
granted.192 These conditions can relate to the off-site protection
of the entire community as well as the subdivision itself. For ex-
ample, a 'board might require that an adequate water supply be
provided for the residents of the subdivision;' 93 that the land
be used safely for building purposes without danger to health or
189. Freilich & Levi, Model Regulations for the Control of Land
Subdivision, 36 Mo. L. Rav. 1 (1971).
190. Associated Home Builders of East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut
Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed,
404 U.S. 878 (1971); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144
Mont. 55, 394 P.2d 182 (1964); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18
N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966); Jordan v. Village
of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965). But see
Pioneer Trust Co. v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d
799 (1961); and Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
191. However, a line of earlier cases holds that plat approval cannot
be denied because of health and safety conditions that are general to
the community. Beach v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 141 Conn. 79,
103 A.2d 814 (1954); but cf. Melli, Subdivision Control in Wisconsin,
1953 Wis. L. Rnv. 389.
192. Noble v. Chairman and Twp. Comm.. 91 N.J. Super. 111,
219 A.2d 335 (App. Div. 1966).
193. Shorb v. Barkley, 108 Cal. App. 2d 873, 240 P.2d 337 (1952).
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peril from flooding; 194 that off-site roads leading to the subdivi-
sion site be adequate in improvement and width to handle the
volume of traffic which will be generated; 19 that the creation
of water pollution problems in areas not within the subdivision
be avoided; 90 and that the subdivision development not be al-
lowed to cause the deterioration of shorelines or wetlands. 197 If
the duty to protect the general community is not fulfilled, the
state or municipality may be liable for resulting damages. A fail-
ure to periodically inspect culverts capable of causing flooding
when clogged' 98 and the intentional authorization of new subdi-
visions with knowledge that flooding and damage to area residents
could result have led to holdings of public liability.' 9 Clearly,
if courts can find municipal and state liability for failing to en-
force strong subdivision standards, there must be authority for
municipalities to deny subdivisions in such cases to prevent lia-
bility from occurring. 200 In fact, some courts assert that there
is not only a right to condition plat approval on non-degradation
of the environment, but a duty.201 However, there may be a line
across which denial of plat approval represents a desire for public
benefit as opposed to harm prevention;20 2 the validity of using
plat rejection as a tool of growth control may depend on how
broadly harm is defined and whether the developer is left with
any reasonable economic uses for his land.
Pressure for stronger subdivision regulations is also begin-
ning to be applied by the federal government. A new regulation
proposed by the Federal Environmental Protection Agency notes
194. Kessler v. Town of Shelter Island Planning Bd., 40 App. Div.
2d 1005, 1006, 338 N.Y.S.2d 778, 780 (1972).
195. Pearson Kent Corp. v. Bear, 28 N.Y.2d 396, 271 N.E.2d 218, 322
N.Y.S.2d 235 (1971); Smith v. Township Comm., 101 N.J. Super. 271, 244
A.2d 145 (1968).
196. Salamar Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221, 275 N.E.2d 585,
325 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1971).
197. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
See also Town of Salem v. County of Kenosha, 57 Wis. 2d 432, 204
N.W.2d 467 (1973).
198. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
199. Eschete v. New Orleans, 258 La. 133, 245 So. 2d 383 (1971).
200. Freilich & Levi, supra note 189.
201. In Walsh v. Spadaccia, 73 Misc. 2d 866, 873, 343 N.Y.S.2d 45,
53 (Sup. Ct. 1973), quoting Nattin Realty, Inc. v. Ludewig, 67 Misc.
2d 828, 831, 324 N.Y.S.2d 668, 672, aff'd, 40 App. Div. 2d 535, 334 N.Y.S.2d
483, affd, 32 N.Y.2d 681, 296 N.E.2d 257, 343 N.Y.S.2d 360 (1973), the
court stated: "Respecting ecology as a new factor, it appears that the
time has come-if indeed it has not already irretrievably passed-for
the courts, as it were, to take ecological notice in zoning matters."
202. Harbor Farms, Inc. v. Nassau County Planning Comm'n, 40
App. Div. 2d 517, 334 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1972).
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the importance of the location of development to air pollution,
and requires states and municipalities to limit new subdivision
developments in areas in which they might cause a deterioration
of ambient air quality standards. 20 3 In addition, there is a trend
toward more stringent control of large-scale projects at the
state level. Maine and Vermont now provide for state or regional
control over such projects. 20 4
Minnesota has enabling legislation for subdivision regulation
which allows both municipalities and urban towns to adopt sub-
division regulations and procedures for plat approval.2 05 The en-
abling legislation is basically similar to national models and pro-
vides that plat approval can be conditioned on conformance with
the official map, improvements, and -the dedication of a reason-
able amount of land, or money in lieu of land, for park purposes.
The basis in Minnesota for regional review and/or approval of
subdivision activity to support phased development in Planning
Area Ill is well established.
3. Official Mapping
The use of the official map technique is extremely important
for timing and sequential controls in Planning Area IlI. It fa-
cilitates the regional capital planning process by effecting a re-
striction on development in those areas where capital public fa-
cilities will be placed.
203. 38 Fed. Reg. 15834 (1973). The implementation plan calls for
identification of "those areas (counties, urbanized areas, standard metro-
politan statistical areas) which, due to current air quality and/or pro-
jected growth rate, may have the potential for exceeding any national
standard within the subsequent 10-year periods" 40 C.F.R. § 51.12(e)
(1973). Then within 24 months the state shall submit an analysis of
the impact on air quality of projected growth and development and a
plan to prevent any national standard from being exceeded over the
10-year period. The plan must include "control strategy revisions
and/or other measures to insure that projected growth and development
will be compatible with maintenance of the national standards through-
out such 10-year period." 40 C.F.R. § 51.12(g) (1973).
204. Msz. RPv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 481 et seq. (Supp. 1973); Vt.
Laws, No. 85 (1973). The Maine Supreme Court has approved these
provisions. In re Spring Valley Dev. Co., 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973).
205. MINN. STAT. §§ 462.351-.364 (1971). The authority permits two
miles of extraterritorial control into unincorporated areas. See L Ball,
Management of Growth for Minnesota Communities 27 (Center for
Study of Local Government, St. John's University, Jan. 1974), for a dis-
cussion of an effective timing and sequential growth control policy
based on subdivision approval in the city of Brooklyn Park, Minnesota.
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The official map technique permits a municipality to effect a
present uncompensated reservation of land upon which it plans
to construct future improvements. The map, which is adopted
legislatively, designates certain areas for roads, 20 0 and occasion-
ally for parks and drainage areas. The designation operates as a
reservation only; title and possession remain with the owner, and
the city pays no compensation unless and until actual condem-
nation proceedings are begun. 20 7 The purpose of the reservation
is to keep the land substantially open, and thus facilitate plan-
ning and ensure lower condemnation costs when and if the land
is eventually taken. The municipality effectuates this purpose
by either denying applications for building permits in the re-
served area, or by providing that compensation will not be paid
for subsequent improvements if the land is condemned. Most
systems have a variance procedure for the landowner unable
to receive a reasonable economic return on either the restricted
parcel or on the legal plot as a whole.20
When the official map sets aside land for roads, most courts
agree that the regulation relates to a valid public objective of
economy and planning.20 9 The use of the map to reserve parks,
however, is not as well established. Parks, unlike roads, repre-
sent a concentrated rather than a dispersed burden, and consti-
tute a public benefit as opposed to a critical health and safety
necessity. Therefore courts tend to hold such mapping invalid,
even if temporary in effect,210 unless compensation for the reser-
vation is made.2 11
Many municipalities do not make adequate use of the offi-
cial map in undeveloped areas where it could control subdivision
and growth to a significant degree. If the path of future high-
ways is determined and municipal facilities are required to follow
mapped streets, then general control over the urban form is es-
tablished, since subdivision plats not in accord with the office
map will not ,be accepted. 21 2
206. Platt v. New York, 276 App. Div. 873, 93 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1949).
207. Kucirek & Beuscher, Wisconsin's Official Map Law, 1957 Wis.
L. REV. 176.
208. Grosso v. Board of Adjustment, 137 N.J.L. 630, 61 A.2d 167 (Sup.
Ct. 1948).
209. Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936);
State ex rel. Miller v. Manders, 2 Wis. 2d 365, 86 N.W.2d 469 (1957).
210. Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951).
211. Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor and Common Council, 51 N.J. 108, 237
A.2d 881 (1968).
212. Krieger v. Planning Comm'n, 224 Md. 320, 167 A.2d 885 (1961).
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However, it seems both undesirable and unlikely that an ex-
panded use of the official map will be used to restrict large
areas without compensation. The official map technique is de-
signed to keep areas free from impediments to future munici-
pal use-rather than to keep them free from any use at all Such
a complete restriction would be an effective condemnation of all
development rights, and thus would probably require compensa-
tion.
Minnesota municipalities have statutory authority to use
official maps 13 and counties may also be authorized to use them,
though this is unclear. The authority delegated to municipali-
ties is substantially in accord with the national models. There
has been no case law on such maps, but presumably decisions
would be in accord with the general authority. A significant
and valuable facet of the Minnesota statute is that a variance is
required to be issued only if the entire legal plot, as opposed to
the actual piece under restraint, has no reasonable economic
use.2 14
C. LONG TERm CONTROLS: PRESERVATION OF OPEN SPACE
AND RuRAL AREAS IN PLANNING AREA IV
Planning Area IV will consist of most of the land beyond the
urbanizing section of the first generation regional capital im-
provement plan. Each year, of course, as capital facilities are
constructed, new capital planning will bring some land in Plan-
ning Area.IV within the sphere of Planning Area II. In addi-
tion, as modifications in the regional capital plan are made to re-
flect the continuous planning process of the region, certain land
may be shifted from one planning area to another. But in gen-
eral, land in Planning Area IV is scheduled to remain in a non-
urban state for at least 15 to 20 years, the period of the regional
capital improvement plan for Planning Area H1L Some of the
land should of course be kept permanently as open space or in a
rural-agricultural state. If land in Planning Area IV is to be pre-
served in open space for rural or non-rural pursuits permanently
or for extended periods, both regulations and incentives will be
required. The law has developed a number of suitable tech-
niques that are being used to varying extents in different juris-
dictions of the country.
213. MXNN. STAT. §§ 462.351-.364 (1971).
214. Id. § 462.359(4). See 3 I. ANDERSON, AmERiCAN LAw OF ZON-




a. Minimum Lot Size
Minimum lot size regulations are used to attain several objec-
tives. A large minimum lot regulation which creates lower den-
sity and intensity of land use can protect the character and aes-
thetics of a rural, open space or agricultural area. The lower in-
tensity of land use actually promotes the conservation of natural
resources in this type of area, and lessens or eliminates the bur-
den on municipal facilities which would be generated if the area
were allowed to urbanize. If a sizeable zone with a large mini-
mum lot size were used within the urbanizing area of Planning
Area III, it might operate to exclude the poor. Its use in the open
rural fringe, however, actually serves a useful public purpose of
preventing unnecessary development. In this locus, minimum lot
size restrictions have a clear relation to public health, safety and
general welfare, leaving little question as to their validity.215
Densities as low as one unit per 10, 20, or even 40 acres
would be ideal for Planning Area IV. They would not discourage
residential use by the farmer of his land and would still permit
reasonable agricultural use because of the rural nature of the
land. This fact demonstrates the tremendous legal value of the
timing and sequential zoning and subdivision controls used in
Planning Area III. By separating the existing urban areas (Plan-
ning Areas I and II) from rural open space areas (Planning Area
IV) by a belt of urbanizing land undergoing capital improvement
over a 15-20 year period (Planning Area III), the landowner in
the rural area does not suffer a confiscatory impact because there
is no basis for suggesting that his land has a viable urban use of
which he is being deprived. 216 The landowner still has a reason-
able remaining economic use for the rural area in which he is
located, and the constitutional balancing test works out appropri-
ately. At the same time, by keeping the restrictions on land in
Planning Area III temporary and reasonable, with a maximum
duration of 20 years, the constitutional prohibition on taking
without compensation is not violated as to that -area.217
215. Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (lst
Cir. 1972); Clemons v. Los Angeles, 36 Cal. 2d 95, 222 P.2d 439 (1950);
Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942).
216. Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st
Cir. 1972); Josephs v. Town Bd., 24 Misc. 2d 366, 198 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup.
Ct. 1960).
217. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
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In the late 1960's there was a trend toward invalidating large
lot zoning in urbanizing surburban areas218 as courts became
aware that large lot zoning, if used improperly, could have the
second and third order consequences of direct discrimination
against the poor and effective discrimination against racial mi-
norities, a disproportionate number of whom are poor. In addi-
tion, -the unwise use of large lot zones in urbanizing areas actu-
ally has a reverse effect from that intended inasmuch as it leads
to wasted land sprawl, social and use imbalance, and the ineffi-
cient provision of municipal services. Such considerations
prompted a number of courts to hold that municipalities cannot
use exclusionary large lot zoning to avoid problems; rather, they
must attempt to deal with them.219
These cases have not resulted in the relegation of the large
lot zone to the graveyard of outmoded ideas. Rather, it is possible
to use such a zone in several growth control contexts without
raising the charge of exclusionary zoning. For example, in
Steelhill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton,20 the First
Circuit upheld a large lot zone in a rural area, stating that it
served a valid function as a temporary holding zone which would
protect the land prior to imposition of more permanent controls.
Similarly, Salamar Builders, Inc. v. Tuttle2 21 approved the use of
large lot zones to control immediate environmental problems
such as the safe disposal of on-site sewage. These cases upheld
the use of large lot requirements as temporary measures to avoid
-the serious problems that might have resulted from greater den-
sity. However, in Nopro Co. v. Town of Cherry Hills Village, - -
it was held that large lot zoning is validly used within the urban
context and for the purpose of land character preservation if the
comprehensive plan for the region provides elsewhere for low
and moderate income housing and other uses excluded from the
zone. Taken together, these cases represent a view that large lot
zoning can be a valuable growth control tool if used in the
proper places, for the proper purposes, and within the framework
of a comprehensive regional plan.2 2 3 Minnesota has no contrary
218. See generally R. BABcocK & F. BOSsELmAN, EXCLUSiONAEtY ZON-
ING, LAND USE REGUIATION AND HOUSING IN TaE 1970's (1973).
219. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Su-
per. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (1971); In re Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466,
268 A.2d 765 (1970).
220. 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972).
221. 29 N.Y.2d 221, 275 N.E.2d 585, 325 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1971).
222. 504 P.2d 344 (Colo. 1972).
223. For a similar theory, substantiated by empirical data, see
Beuscher, Judicial Zoning Through the Nuisance Power, 1955 Wis. L.
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case law on the use of large lot zoning.224
b. Agricultural Zoning
Agricultural zoning is quite similar to large lot zoning. The
regulation may provide for very large minimum plots and for
low intensity uses such as farming, recreation, nurseries, and,
perhaps, limited residential development. Agricultural zones
are the least intensive and most exclusive zones of all.22G
Agricultural zoning may serve several purposes. It may be
used to conserve valuable agricultural land from forced, prema-
ture urban conversion; to prevent an overload on environmen-
tally sensitive areas or on municipal facilities; or simply as a
growth control device. Well-positioned agricultural zones can
contain the outward spread of development and guide it into
areas where the municipalities can more adequately accommo-
date the new growth. The area can be subsequently down-zoned
when the community feels it is ready for development. 20
The validity of agricultural zoning is more open to question
than that of large lot zoning because of the severe impact it im-
poses, although there is authority upholding it.221 The public
interests served clearly are valid; however, since they are not
substantially linked to public health and safety they may not
REv. 440, establishing that the judicial determination of nuisance varies
widely with respect to the locus of the nuisance, i.e., rural fringe, sub-
urban or high density urban core. See also Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926): "A nuisance may merely be a
right thing in the wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of the
barnyard."
224. In fact, Minnesota courts do not appear to have passed specifi-
cally on the validity of the large lot zone. However, there is case author-
ity supporting the total exclusion of high intensity uses (mobile homes)
from a rural municipality. Hay v. Township of Grow, 206 N.W.2d 19, 23
(Minn. 1973).
225. This device can, like all other zoning devices, be misused if
applied in the wrong areas for exclusionary purposes. Thus the exclu-
sive agricultural zone in the expanding urbanizing or suburban area
would have drastic effects on low and moderate income housing and
housing costs in general. In this respect it is like the exclusive, non-
cumulative industrial zone which can be properly and improperly uti-
lized. For a classic treatment of these techniques, see Cutler, Legal and
Illegal Methods for Controlling Community Growth on the Urban
Fringe, 1961 WIs. L. REv. 370. See also Freilich & Bass, Exclusionary
Zoning: Suggested Litigation Approaches, 3 Urns. LAw. 344 (1971).
226. Lee Jackson Dev. Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 3 E.R.C. 1961 (5th
Cir. 1972).
227. Mang v. County of Santa Barbara, 182 Cal. App. 2d 93, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 724 (1960); State ex rel. Randall v. Snohomish, 79 Wash. 2d 619,
488 P.2d 511 (1971).
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support such a high degree of impact on the land owners. The
severity of impact, which results from the limited use, is exacer-
bated where plots exist within the zone that are not physically
or economically suitable for agriculture. Beyond that, owners of
large scale land holdings may be subject to very high property
tax burdens, as speculators, well aware of zoning's imperman-
ence, cause the market and assessment value to rise by pur-
chases within the zoned areas. Thus, if agricultural zoning is to
be used, it would seem advisable to consider methods to lessen its
potential impact. Tax adjustments could ease much of the bur-
den. For example, an assessment at use value rather than mar-
ket value would substantially lower the tax liability.28 In addi-
tion, a temporary agricultural zone, with a definite time limita-
tion, is much more likely to be sustained than a permanent
one.Y Finally, an adequate variance procedure would seem to
be mandatory.230
c. Minnesota Law on Agricultural Zoning
The Minnesota Supreme Court has specifically held that a
municipality on the periphery of the metropolitan area may con-
stitutionally pass a one-use ordinance to preserve the area's char-
acter.23' The state legislature has recognized the utility of agri-
cultural zones by providing that an airport to be built within a
metropolitan area should be surrounded by agricultural zones to
the fullest extent possible consistent with vested rights.23 2 Other
varieties of exclusive use zones233 have also been sustained, and
the court has indicated that a property owner within the zone
who seeks a use variance must show, first, that he has no reason-
able economic use under the ordinance and, second, that the pro-
posed use would not affect the neighborhorhood plan3 4 There
is ample precedent in Minnesota for the use of exclusive agricul-
228. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dimissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
229. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union City, 424
F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
230. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
231. Conner v. Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d
789 (1957). See also C.G. Rein Co. v. Bjorndahl, 290 Minn. 562, 189 N.W.
2d 162 (1971).
232. Mnwi. STAT. § 360.74(2) (1971).
233. Filister v. Minneapolis, 270 Minn. 53, 133 N.W.2d 500 (1954)
(residential); State ex Tel. Berndt v. Iten, 259 Minn. 77, 106 N.W.2d 366
(1960) (industrial).
234. Filister v. Minneapolis, 270 Minn. 53, 133 N.W.2d 500 (1964).
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tural zones, but, should such zones be used on a wide scale as
part of a growth control plan in areas of intense development
pressure, it may be necessary to reduce the impact by tax abate-
ment, definite time limitations, and provisions for variances or
compensation. If 'agricultural zones are limited to Planning Area
IV, these restrictions on their use may not be necessary.
2. Compensatory Approaches
Growth control and the preservation of open space can in-
volve very significant burdens on restricted landowners. A vi-
able growth control scheme on a regional level may have to in-
clude provision for some form of compensation or public owner-
ship of land interests in conjunction with regulation. The pri-
mary purpose of this compensation is to reduce the impact on re-
stricted owners and to prevent crippling attacks on the specific
or general constitutionality of the scheme. In addition, compen-
satory approaches may enhance the political feasibility of the
growth control concept, a not unimportant consideration. Such
an approach may also be necessary to prevent the "wipeouts" or
"windfalls" 235 which sometimes result from regulation. Restrict-
ing growth in one area may "wipe out" one landowner and pro-
vide a "windfall" for the owner in a development district into
which the growth is diverted. It may be desirable to devise
means to recapture some of the unearned windfall stemming
from regulation and use it to compensate the restricted owner.
a. Zoning with Condemnation and Benefit Assessment
Several jurisdictions, including Missouri and Minnesota, have
combined a restrictive land use regulation with a condemnation
proceeding to avoid constitutional objection to the regulation.
This approach, which uses eminent domain to condemn all rights
in derogation of the ordinance, including the right to a vested
non-conforming use and the right to a variance because of unnec-
essary hardship, has recently been held to be a valid exercise of
the police power and the power of eminent domain.230 The con-
235. See LAND USE PLANNING REPORTS, Oct. 8, 1973, at 6, for a discus-
sion of Professor Donald Hagman's study on this subject for the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development.
236. Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969). The stand-
ards for granting a variance and the showing necessary to sustain an
allegation of specific unconstitutionality are virtually the same. Sha-
piro, The Zoning Variance Power-Constructive in Theory, Destructive
in Practice, 29 Mi. L. REv. 1 (1969). Compare Otto v. Steinhilber, 282
N.Y. 71, 24 N.E.2d 851 (1939) with Fulling v. Palumbo, 21 N.Y.2d 30,
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demnation costs are paid by assessing those within the planning
district who were benefited by the regulation. This approach
permits the regulation to operate at its full effectiveness without
being vitiated by intruding non-conforming uses or constitutional
attacks. In addition, the benefit assessment allows a recapture of
some of the windfall planning benefits and their redistribution
to those suffering injury. If the system were efficiently operated,
complete control could be attained at minimal public cost. There
are, however, administrative problems which appear even at a
local level237 and which might be vastly more complex on a re-
gional scale.
Minnesota has had considerable experience with zoning by
use of eminent domain. Perhaps the most noteworthy statute on
this subject is MINFSOTA STATuTES § 462.12, which provides for
the establishment of restricted residence districts within cities of
the first class.2 38 If 50 percent of the landowners within the dis-
trict petition the city council, the district can be designated as
one exclusively for residential uses. The council then can use the
power 6f eminent domain to condemn the rights in derogation
of the ordinance. A board of appraisers determines both the
damages and the benefits, which are assessed to pay for the dam-
ages. This technique has been upheld2 39 and has been held to
create property -rights akin to equitable negative easements.2 40
Although benefit assessment may be feasible on the large scale
contemplated by growth control plans, when the planning dis-
tricts become too large there is apt to be an attenuation in the
link between regulation and benefit that can render an assess-
ment invalid as an uncompensated taking.241 The experience
233 N.E.2d 272, 286 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1967), and Kenyon v. Quinones, 43
App. Div. 2d 125, 350 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1973).
237. See Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 636 (1972); In re Coleman Highlands,
401 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1966). The Coleman Highlands-Kansas City neigh-
borhood, making use of the technique, has witnessed a number of law-
suits over the assessment problems and the conversion of non-conform-
ing uses required under the ordinance. See J. Dorsey, The Results of
"Zoning With Compensation!' in Coleman Highlands, A Subdivision in
Kansas City, Missouri, March 21, 1973 (unpublished research paper filed
with Professor Freilich).
238. DNNI. STAT. §§ 462.12-.17 (1971). Regulations supported by the
power of eminent domain are also authorized for airport zoning, MINN.
STAT. § 360.76(1) (1971), and official mapping, MInN. STAT. § 462.351
(1971).
239. State ex rel. Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144
Minn. 1, 176 N.W. 159 (1920), noted with approval in Berry v. Houghton,
273 U.S. 671 (1927).
240- Burger v. St. Paul, 241 Minn. 285, 64 N.W.2d 73 (1954).
241. Myles Salt Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 339 U.S. 478 (1916) (drain-
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with this statute has value, in that it establishes both a legislative
and a judicial precedent for compulsory monetary transfers in
the wake of regulation. This may set the stage for acceptance
of still another approach, involving the transfer of development
rights.
b. Development Rights Transfer
Development rights transfer is a method of land control and
compensation which has been proposed as state legislation242 but
not yet adopted. Under one model,243 the regulatory unit or
units would prepare comprehensive plans that would designate
areas to be developed as residential and commercial and areas to
be kept as open space or rural-agricultural fringe. The unit
would next determine the number of "development rights" nec-
essary for desired commercial or residential construction, basing
the calculation on the number of development rights per unit of
commercial or residential construction and on the total area al-
lotted for the particular uses. The planning body could thus cal-
culate the maximum number of commercial and residential de-
velopment rights available within the planning area. A portion
of both types of development rights would be assigned to every
landowner in the planning area, even those in restricted dis-
tricts. 2 44 Thus, at the outset everyone in the planning area has
develoment rights: the landowner in the restricted zone has de-
velopment rights but cannot use them; the landowner in the de-
velopment zone has development rights but not enough to permit
full development. The plan then contemplates -the buying and
selling of development rights, either on the open market or
age assessment held invalid where land could not possibly benefit from
drainage).
242. See Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory
Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973); W. Cox & H. Burt, Administration of De-
velopment Control: Legal and Economic Considerations 45 (Fairfax
County, Virginia, Sept. 15, 1973). Maryland, Florida and New Jersey
have had bills introduced in their legislatures.
243. Maryland Senate Bills 730 (1973), 254 (1972) and 792 (1971),
sponsored by Maryland State Senator William J. Goodman of Prince
George's County.
244. The development rights so created are to be issued to land
owners of record in the district on the basis of their proportional interest(assessed valuation or acreage) in the total acreage or assessed valua-
tion of the district. When rights are issued to an owner of developed
real estate, all rights in that category attach to the improvement and
cannot be sold or transferred separately. If additional development
rights are issued by the governing body, they too will accrue propor-
tionately. See Cox & Burt, supra note 242, at 46.
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through a mechanism such as a commodities exchange, stock
market, or development rights bank. The landowner in a devel-
opment zone can develop his land fully, but must pay something
for the right; the landowner in a restricted zone cannot develop
but can sell rights and obtain compensation. Thus, the impact
of regulation is lessened sufficiently to bring it within the limits
of the police power, and the public acquires permanent open
space at no public cost.
There is no direct precedent for the use of this approach to
control growth, but analogous techniques have been approved in
other contexts. Several cities have used transfers of air rights as
a means of protecting historical landmarks, permitting the owner
of a historical building below the maximum height established
for the zoning district to sell his unused airspace to a developer
who can then exceed the height limitation by the amount pur-
chased. 245 Similarly, many municipalities have experimented
with bonus and incentive zoning whereby a developer can build
to a greater height or density if he provides amenities or open
space to the public.246 In addition, the United States Supreme
Court has recognized the validity of private value transfers pur-
suant to regulation of a natural resource. 47
Because the concept of development rights transfer for land
regulation is as yet untried, it is fraught with problems; how-
ever, it is certainly worth considering. The land use regulatory
process needs a means of compensating restricted parties and
245. See generally, Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning
and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARY. L. REv. 574 (1972);
Lawrence, Leasing of Airspace Utilization on Highway Rights of Way,
55 IowA L. Rrv. 766 (1970); Morris, Zoning Imagination-DimensionaL
Zoning, 46 ST. JoBN's L. Rv. 679 (1972). See also Minn. Laws 1973,
ch. 764, which authorizes the establishment of a development district in
the city of St. Paul and the lease or sale of air rights over structures
and rights of way.
246. Chrinko v. South Brunswick Twp. Planning Bd., 77 N.J. Super.
594, 187 A.2d 221 (1963); E. RoBERTs, LAND USE PLANNING, §§ 4-105 to
4-122 (1970). See Section VI infra for discussion of the use of bonus
and incentive zoning to encourage development of low and moderate
income housing in the region.
247. Oil reserves in a pool are allotted to field drillers on a percent-
age basis, Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573(1940); Champlin-Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 235(1932). See also Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885) (per-
mitting construction of dams by private owners causing flooding of up-
stream lands as long as the dam owner pays damages for the value
of the land taken); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257
N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970) (permitting a factory to pollute
neighboring property by refusing to grant an injunction to abate the nui-
sance and substituting damages for value "taken").
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equitably recapturing the windfalls which flow fortuitously to
owners of non-restricted land. Development rights transfers
are designed to accomplish both ends with, ideally, no cost to
the public. However, since there is no precedent treating such
transfers, it is difficult to predict how a statute or ordinance
might withstand attacks. In particular, the delegation of the po-
lice power implicit in the authorization of marketable rights,
the reasonableness of the exercise of police power, and the ra-
tionality of the classification and uniformity of its application
might be subject to challenge. 248
D. PUBLIC OWNERSHIP AND PURCHASE OF LAND AND INTERESTS
IN LAND Am PREFERENTIAL ASSESSMENT
1. Public Purchase and Ownership
Government ownership of undeveloped land or interests in
land potentially could be the basis for a complete land use con-
trol program. Ownership could serve a protective function;
scenic areas, historic monuments, recreation areas, agricultural
land and aesthetic interests could all be more completely pre-
served than by any other means. In addition, public ownership
of land interests could be the basis for growth control. Owner-
ship would enable the government to release land or develop-
ment rights when and where the comprehensive plan and the
capital budget warranted, and under the proper conditions. In
short, government ownership would permit a degree of land con-
trol similar to that of an urban renewal plan, but over a much
larger area.
There are several methods by which government or public
ownership of private land interests could be achieved. The state
could purchase, condemn or acquire by gift the full fee interest
in particular land. It likewise could acquire a less-than-fee in-
terest such as a development easement or right.2 49  Less fre-
quently, a pre-existing public interest in particular land that is
inconsistent with and superior to presently asserted private
rights could be asserted on the basis of historic grants, prescrip-
tion and customary usage.25 0
248. See Cox & Burt, supra note 242, at 46.
249. C. LITTLE, CHALLENGE OF THE LAND 66 (1968).
250. See State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671
(1969) where the state successfully asserted title to beaches, using a
concept of general custom. New Jersey, Georgia and Maine have also




The federal government has a number of programs that
make funds available for protective and open space land acquisi-
tion,251 as do numerous states, including Minnesota. 2 2 In fact, the
validity of these acquisition statutes has not been seriously chal-
lenged even when the easements are scenic, and thus arguably
aesthetic. The leading case of Kamarowski v. State-2 53 held that
an easement is a condemnable interest in property254 and that
protection of scenic resources and preservation of sight lines
are valid public purposes in spite of their aesthetic association. 2 5
The case also held there was no question of impact on the land-
owner since compensation foreclosed any damage claim.
When the public purpose of a condemnation or public pur-
chase shifts from environmental protection or recreation provi-
sion to growth control, a host of practical problems arises. For
instance, there may be political resistance to such a high degree
of government intervention in land use decisions. In addition,
since a regional growth plan implemented by public ownership
would demand the acquisition of large scale interests very
quickly, there might also be financial problems in acquiring suf-
ficient land or interests to make the plan effective. An adequate
acquisition would require a tremendous initial investment, even
if the subsequent sale or leaseback might even the balance sheet.
The financial burden might be lessened considerably if the
growth control plan made use of easements instead of fee inter-
ests. Negative easements in the nature of development rights are
not only far less expensive than the full fee, but both title and
possession remain with -the private owner, so that the land is
taxable and usable within limits of the easement.2 6 Granting
251. Cropland Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1838 (1970); Land and
Water Conservation Fund Act, 16 U.S.C. § 4601-5 (Supp. 31, 1972); Water-
shed Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1001-05 (Supp. H, 1972); 42 U.S.C. §
1500 et seq. (1970).
252. CAL- GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 6950-54, 7000 (West 1966); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1316 (1972); MAss. LAWs ANN. ch. 40 § 8C (1973);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:8A-19-34 (Supp. 1974); N.Y. PARKS AND RECREA-
TioN LAW, §§ 13.15, 15.01-.07 (McKinney 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 23.09
(1973). Minnesota permits public acquisition of land for natural or
scientific areas, MINN. STAT. § 84.033 (Supp. 1973). Also, it allows ac-
quisition of easements or title along wild rivers. MINN. STAT. § 104.37
(Supp. 1973).
253. 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966).
254. Petition of Dreosch, 233 Minn. 274, 47 N.W.2d 106 (1951),
reaches a similar result.
255. 31 Wis. 2d 256, 266-67, 142 N.W.2d 793, 798 (1966), citing Ber-
man v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
256. State v. Casey, 263 Minn. 47, 115 N.W.2d 749 (1962); see also
U.S: Crn=zNs' AiVIsoRy CoMIXnTrEE oN ENVIRONMNsTAL QUALITY, CoMi-
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an easement instead of selling the entire fee can be of significant
benefit to the landowner for tax purposes. If the owner makes a
gift of an easement it will qualify as a deduction from his taxable
income equal to the fair market value of the property rights
donated. 257 This would permit the landowner to retain his land
profitably, resisting rising property tax assessments and the
promise of profits if he sells the land for development. 258 New
Jersey plans to condemn a development easement on some one
million acres of farm land, paying the cost through a tax on real
estate transfers. 259
Permanent easements may present problems concerning
fragmented ownership and may constitute a -barrier to replan-
ning of the area.260 Therefore it may be wiser to use temporary
easements which can accomplish most if not all the growth con-
trol objects of permanent easements, without fragmenting own-
ership and at a greatly reduced cost. In addition, a temporary
easement might ,be procurable through uncompensated regula-
tion.281
Aside from the practical hurdles where growth control is its
sole object, the validity of the purchase might be questioned. The
public use limitation 20 2 on eminent domain and public purchase
is not a barrier to growth control per se; the protection of sensi-
tive land, the effectuation of planning, the preservation of health,
safety and economics are all clearly valid public objectives.
However, growth control by means of eminent domain and pub-
lic purchase would require the acquisition of interests in land
well in advance of actual use. Some jurisdictions have held, re-
lying on state constitutional law, that excess or future condem-
MUNITY ACTION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 16 (1970); Jordahl, Con-
servation and Scenic Easements: An Experience Resume, 39 LAND Eco-
NoIcs 343, 354 (1963).
257. Rev. Rul. 73-339, 1973 INT. REv. BULL. No. 34, at 6; Rev. Rul.
205, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 62-63.
258. Comment, Easements to Preserve Open Space Land, 1 ECOLOGY
L. REv. 728, 739 (1971).
259. LAND USE PLANNING REPORTS, Nov. 5, 1973, at 6. The tax is to
be set at .004 percent of the purchase price. The cost contemplated
is $27,000,000 a year, based on the difference between the land's market
value and remaining use value.
260. ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 4-205, Comments at 26-
27 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1973).
261. See Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972); State ex tel.
Miller v. Manders, 2 Wis. 2d 365, 86 N.W.2d 469 (1957).
262. The limitation stems from the fifth amendment and was made
applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment. It also appears
in the vast majority of state constitutions, e.g., MINN. CONsT. art. 1, § 13.
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nation is not a public purpose. This means that acquisition for
uses well beyond those clearly foreseeable may be invalid.2 3
However, courts are beginning to recognize a need or even a
duty to plan for the future. This would justify advance acqui-
sitions for long range projects as being well within the public
use limitation.2 64 Notably, the only jurisdiction that has, at pres-
ent, considered a true land banking scheme found it well within
the limits of public use and purpose.2 5
2. Preferential Property Taxation
A critical factor involved in the decision to restrict develop-
ment of land through the police power or by development ease-
ment acquisition is the constitutional requirement that the land
assessment be reduced to correspond to the restriction on devel-
opment placed on the property.
Taxation can be an important determinant in land use deci-
sions, both personal and judicial.200 The property tax, in partic-
ular, can be used to foster the preservation of open space, or to
destroy it. This tax can be used in conjunction with growth con-
trol plans as a means of reducing regulatory impact, or it can
work at cross purposes by increasing both the impact and, there-
fore, the likelihood of unconstitutionality. Property tax assess-
ments are based upon the true value of the plot on the market;
thus they tend to rise as development becomes imminent.2 7
Even land zoned for agricultural or low density residential use
will begin to rise in value as nearby areas develop, since specula-
tors will take their chances on the impermanence of zoning and
the inconstancy of zoning administrators and policy decision-mak-
ers.2 68 The increases in the market value and tax burden can
have two disastrous consequences: the forced conversion of the
263. Board of Educ. v. Baczewski, 340 Mich. 265, 65 N.W.2d 810
(1954); see Mo. CoxsT. art. 1, § 27; but see Opinion of the Justices,
330 Mass. 713, 113 N.E.2d 452 (1953).
264. Rueb v. Oklahoma City, 435 P.2d 139 (Okla. 1967); Carlor Co.
v. Miami, 62 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1953).
265. Rosso v. Commonwealth, 226 F. Supp. 688 (D.P.R. 1964). How-
ever, the Puerto Rico Land Administration was under a 15 year limita-
tion for putting the land held to use.
266. Zimmerman, Tax Planning For Land Use Control, 5 Usa. LAw.
639 (1973).
267. Dopson & Miller, Effects of Urban Expansion on Ownership,
Use and Taxation of Agricultural Land 907 (Univ. of Mo., College of
Agriculture, Res. Bull. 1966).
268. Elias & Gillies, Some Observations on the Role of Speculators
and Speculation in Land Development, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 789 (1965).
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open space may render the owner financially incapable of main-
taining an unintensive use,269 or, if the land is restricted by reg-
ulation, the rising tax burden may be viewed as increasing the
regulatory impact sufficiently to make the plan unconstitutional
as a taking.270
There are several methods available to deal with these prob-
lems. A number of states use preferential assessment, taxing
open land on its actual use value rather than its potential use
value.27'1 However, unless preferential assessment is combined
with some type of recapture provision, this can provide a haven
for speculators, permitting land to be held open for later, more
profitable development while the taxpayers subsidize the oper-
ation. The regulatory impact may also be mitigated by a con-
tract between the landowner and the municipality in which the
owner agrees to keep the land open for a certain number of
years in return for an assessment based on use value. Should the
landowner desire to break the contract, he is generally subject
to recapture of the deferred taxes plus a penalty.27 2 A similar
method, called tax deferral, allows use value assessment and de-
ferred tax recapture without the necessity of a formal contract.279
There does not appear to be any serious problem with the
validity of deferred taxation. Although some cases indicate that
preferential assessment might violate the uniformity require-
ment or equal protection, 27 4 if the use made is pursuant to re-
striction and not choice there is a reasonable basis for distinction.
In addition, some state legislatures, including Minnesota's, are
given broad discretion to make taxation classifications and to
apply uniform rates within the classes. 27 6
The urban-rural service district may also be used to alle-
viate the property tax impact of use restrictions. This plan keys
the rate of taxation on urban and rural land within a single tax-
269. Wershow, Argicultural Zoning in Florida-Its Implications and
Problems, 13 U. FLA. L. REV. 479 (1960).
270. Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d
587 (1938).
271. Seventeen states use this method. See LAND USE PLANNING RE-
PORTS, Nov. 5, 1973, at 6.
272. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58-769 (Supp., 1973). Five states use
this method.
273. LAND USE PLANNING REPORTS, Nov. 5, 1973, at 6.
274. See, e.g., State Tax Comm'n v. Gales, 222 Md. 543, 161 A.2d
676 (1960).
275. Dulton Realty, Inc. v. State, 270 Minn. 1, 132 N.W.2d 394 (1964);
Lyons v. Spaeth, 220 Minn. 563, 20 N.W.2d 481 (1945); Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. Tax Comm'r, 216 Minn. 307, 12 N.W.2d 625 (1943).
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ing.jurisdiction to the level of services provided. Thus, if an area
within a political unit is rural or agricultural in nature it can be
designated as such and taxed at a lower rate.-07G Several advan-
tages flow from this approach. First, it lowers the burden on
rural areas which might otherwise face premature conversion.
This reduction of the tax burden may prevent an attack based on
specific constitutionality, since it may be used to counter the ar-
gument that the city must as a matter of equal protection and
common-law duty extend facilities to the area.27  Second, the
plan may permit the municipality to concentrate its capital in-
vestment in the urban area.
Several other tax proposals have been suggested to counter
the forces of speculation, sprawl and windfalls. An unearned
increment tax could be levied on the profits that a landowner re-
ceives from the fortuitous location of a governmental installa-
tion or from the diversion of growth from a restricted area.
Such a tax could then be used to compensate those restricted,
thus producing an effect akin to the transference of development
rights. A proposal for a land gains transfer tax designed to de-
ter speculation and quick sellouts is currently before the Ver-
mont Legislature.278 The tax would be incident to land trans-
fers and would be graduated on the basis of two variables: the
number of years the owner held the land, and the profit margin
as a percentage of original cost.
3. Minnesota Open Space Taxation
In Minnesota the state legislature has broad power to create
classifications for the application of the property tax. As long as
the classification is reasonable, the regulation is uniform within
the class and the tax is collected for a public purpose, the tax
is valid.279 This broad authority has encouraged the legislature
to enact a number of tax laws favoring the retention of open
space. For example, any municipality280 can divide into rural-ur-
276. The technique was held valid in Frazer v. Carr, 210 Tenn. 565,
360 S.W.2d 449 (1962), despite the presence of a state uniformity of
taxation clause. Minnesota provides for urban-rural service areas when
orderly annexation processes are used and land is taken into a munici-
pality over a three to five year period. See MINN. STAT. § 414.041(4)
(a) (1971), as amended by Minn. Laws 1973, ch. 621 § 5.
277. Reid Dev. Corp. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 10 N.J.
229, 89 A.2d 667 (1952).
278. LAN UsE PL.M Ga REPoaTs, Nov. 5, 1973, at 9.
279. Lyons v. Spaeth, 220 Minn. 563, 20 N.W.2d 481 (1945).
280. Except municipalities located in Ramsey and Hennepin Coun-
ties. Mum. STAT. § 473.02(5) (1971).
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ban service areas and tax at a different percentage of assessed
valuation.28 ' When a district obtains services or development, It
must be reclassified.
Minnesota also has several laws permitting an owner of open
land2 2 to be taxed at use value instead of market value. If
conversion to intensive use is made, the laws provide for a roll-
back to recapture some of the deferred taxation.2 83 Unfortun-
ately, the laws have several shortcomings that may subvert their
purpose. Since the landowner may convert the land from its
open space use by development at any time with only a rollback
penalty of the taxes and interest that he would have paid if the
land were assessed at market value, the municipality cannot plan
on utilizing these programs to control the timing and sequence of
land development; development may occur prematurely in open
space areas at the developer's sole option. Secondly, the stat-
utes may actually encourage speculation since the developer has
received a loan on his taxes for the period of the preferential
assessment. Furthermore, the municipality cannot refuse de-
velopment easements to landowners with the legally required
minimum acreage, even if the land is located in urban areas
where development of skipped-over land has a high priority. Fi-
nally, since the owner is also exempt from special assessment
taxation, it encourages leapfrogging of utility extensions and
may result in an inadequate revenue base for provision of muni-
cipal utility services. 28 4 The laws should be amended to require
the property owner to convey an easement to the municipality
for the period of anticipated open space use, so that the land
cannot be converted to a more intensive use except by the
mutual consent of the parties. An Open Space Land Commis-
sion could be established to evaluate hardship cases and grant
variances. 285
281. MmiN. STAT. § 272.67 (1971). A closely parallel provision pro-
vides for differential taxation on annexation for up to five years to re-
flect the different levels of municipal facilities. MINN. STAT. § 414.041
(4) (a) (1971), as amended by Minn. Laws 1973, ch. 621, § 5. See note
276 supra.
282. Minnesota Agricultural Property Tax Law, MINN. STAT. §
273.111 (1973); Minnesota Open Space Property Tax Law, MINN. STAT.
§ 273.112 (1971); reduction of tax for swamp and marshlands reserved
as wild life preserves, MiNN. STAT. § 272.59 (1971).
283. Seventeen states provide for some form of rollback provision.
LAND USE PLANNInG REPORTS, Nov. 5, 1973, at 6.
284. CITIZENS LEAGUE REPORT, supra note 10, at 28.
285. See C. LITTLE, CHAULENGE OF THE LAND (1968).
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E. Pzu~wrI-T CoNROLs: ENm OMNTALLY CmTIcAL AREAs
(FLooD PLAn s, WmrLAms AD PUBLIC TRUST LANDs)
Some lands in the region must remain permanently open or
controlled, regardless of whether they are in the urban-developed
or rural-open space areas. These lands are environmentally crit-
ical areas which would be severely damaged if subjected to de-
velopment.
1. Flood Plains
State and local governmental units have made considerable
use of flood plain zoning to restrict the nature and intensity of
land use within both the stream channel and the flood plain.
There are several objectives served by such zoning. Within the
channel, such regulation prevents impediments to navigation and
the stream's carrying capacity. It also clearly helps to avoid the
threat to health, safety and welfare which is occasioned by flood-
ing. In addition, the regulation of land use intensity adjacent
to watercourses may result in open space and areas of scenic and
recreational value.
In their original form most standard enabling acts do not
mention the control of flood plains and channels as a purpose of
zoning, but courts may be willing to imply this power.28 In ad-
dition many legislatures have either added such purposes to the
zoning enabling act or have created special enabling legislation-2- 7
Because flood plain zoning ordinances may result in such a se-
vere impact on the land owner, they may be subject to attack as
unconstitutional takings without compensation.28
While it seems clear that the general objectives of flood plain
zoning are legitimate,28 9 the objectives' weight in the balancing
process may vary considerably. Even when public health and
safety are the asserted objectives, the weight will be a function
286. D. H&GmAN, URBAN PLANNING AN LA= DEvELoPFENT CoN-
TROL LAW 115 (1971).
287. Comment, Ecological and Legal Aspects of Flood Plain Zoning,
20 U. KAN. L. REv. 268 (1972). Minnesota has enacted a Flood Plain
Management Act, Mnn. STAT. §§ 104.01-.07 (1971), as amended by Minn
Laws 1973, ch. 351, creating a state commission with authority to coordi-
nate state, local and federal activities with regard to flood plains.
Local ordinances must be reviewed for conformity and a failure of local
initiative can be rectified.
288. For a critical analysis, see U.S. CouNcL ON ENmoV -rNETALQUALITY, Fou=R ANNUAL REaORT 121-53 (1973).
289. Sturdy Homes, Inc. v. Township of Redford, 30 Mich. App. 53,
186 N.W.2d 43 (1971).
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of the likelihood of flooding and the potential severity of harm.
If the asserted interests are health and safety and if there is a
high forseeability of danger, the courts seem willing to sustain a
high degree of impact. 290 Many courts are willing to defer to
legislative discretion on this point.291 However, likelihood and
severity vary not only from basin to basin, but within each par-
ticular basin. Thus, on the -periphery of any given flood plain
zone, the asserted interest in health and safety may be of mini-
mal weight. In these areas, the primary objective may be open
space which, though accepted as a general welfare objective, may
not sustain a high degree of uncompensated impact.2 2 Courts
may view the regulations as the securing of public open space at
private expense. 293
2. Wetlands Regulation
There is an increasing national trend to protect shorelines,
swamps and other areas of special ecological significance by re-
stricting the nature and intensity of land use within a designated
distance of shorelines. Although the method of protection is sim-
ilar to that of flood plain zoning, most wetland regulations are
not aimed at the preservation of health and safety from flooding.
Rather they seek to protect water supplies and sensitive environ-
mental areas from the impairment which may be caused by de-
velopment and filling.
The validity of such regulations depends initially on the en-
acting body's having adequate authority. Since the objectives and
methods are fairly unique, such controls may require special
legislative authorization.294 In recent years there has been an
outpouring of wetland zoning enabling acts. Most of these acts
authorize control at the state or regional level, a recognition that
municipal regulation alone may not provide adequate protection
of ecological concerns. 295 Minnesota has recently adopted the
290. Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 93 (1972); Vartelas v. Water Resources Comm'n, 146 Conn. 650,
153 A.2d 822 (1959).
291. Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891
(Mass. 1973).
292. An early but excellent analysis of the constitutional problems
in this area is, Dunham, Flood Control Via The Police Power, 107 U.
PA. L. REv. 1098 (1959).
293. Dooley v. Town Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304,
197 A.2d 770 (1964); Baker v. Planning Bd., 353 Mass. 141, 228 N.E.2d
831 (1967).
294. MacGibbon v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 356 Mass. 635, 255
N.E.2d 347 (1970).
295. California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
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Shorelands Development in Municipalities Act,2 6 whereby a state
commission promulgates model standards for land within desig-
nated distances of lakes, ponds and flowage. Local plans not in
compliance may be modified by the commission. Even with leg-
islation granting specific authority there are some remaining
problems of constitutionality. While the primary objectives of
wetland zoning are valid, they come close to being public bene-
fits, and thus courts have occasionally held such regulation with-
out compensation invalid.297
However, due in part to the increased recognition of the im-
portance of preserving the environment, there is a noticeable
trend towards upholding the validity of wetlands regulations.
Several courts have held that a diminution of value based on de-
velopment potential through changing the character of the wet-
land is not a factor in assessing constitutional reasonableness.2 98
The result in these decisions may be due in part to the doctrine
of public trust, which permits additional state regulation of activ-
ities that might harm areas of special public interest. -0
Wetland regulations and flood plain zoning provide useful
tools to control environmentally sensitive areas, to provide open
space, and to protect health and safety. However, they are not
really growth control tools as their spatial scope is limited to a
defined distance from the natural feature. They are not as ef-
fective in guiding growth into certain areas as they are in keep-
ing it out of others.
3. Public Trust
Certain natural resources such as navigable waterways,
timber, minerals and some types of land are often considered
to be held in trust for the people. Coastlines and navigable wa-
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin have all
adopted state or regional controls over coastlines and wetlands; see
note 288 supra.
296. M1n. STAT. §§ 105A85(2), (3), 462.357(1) (Supp. 1973).
297. Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsip-
pany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
298. In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973); see gener-
ally Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of Maryland, 266 Md. 358,
293 A.2d 241 (1972); Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. Kirkland,
9 Wash. App. 59, 510 P.2d 1140 (1973).
299. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 671 (1972).
The Minnesota wetlands statute is very similar to Wisconsin's and has
the vestige of a navigable waters trust doctrine. M=wN. STAT. §§ 105.-
485(2), (3), 462.357 (1) (Supp. 1973).
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ters30° are the areas most often deemed in trust. Moreover, navi-
gable waters are often thought to include not only those waters
useable for commercial purposes but also those which are "capa-
ble of recreational use," a much broader concept.80 1 The public
trust can have significant impact on private use and ownership,
since land in the vicinity of trust lands is deemed to be held sub-
ject to the trust. 0 2 The public trust cannot be sold for private
benefit,303 and the state may have constitutional and statutory
power to regulate land use in the immediate area of the public
trust in order to prevent harm to it. 80 4 It should prove helpful
to a growth control plan to fully explore the limits of public trust
and determine if the land use which is desired to be regulated
will directly or substantially interfere with the trust. If it has
such effect, it may well be regulable without compensation.
VI. THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF GROWTH CONTROL
AND LOW-MODERATE INCOME HOUSING
The control of growth by timing and sequential planning
should result in substantial savings to the region. A comprehen-
sive economic study of the town of Ramapo's timing and sequen-
tial controls indicates that substantial savings in municipal costs
and lower rates will result from the controls. 05 Other studies
indicate that scattered site and leapfrog development and low-
density zoning practices in urbanizing areas substantially in-
300. MimN. CoNsT. art. 2, § 2, is the basis for this kind of a trust
doctrine as navigable rivers and waters are deemed common highways
and forever free. Article 8, sections 6 and 7, indicate that timber and
mineral rights can also be subjects of public trust.
301. People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 448 (1971).
302. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. App. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr.
790 (1971).
303. Swan Island Club v. White, 114 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1953);
1 V. YANNACONE et al., ENVIRoNMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 29
(1972).
304. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Just v. Marinette County, 56
Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), held that the state could validly regu-
late wetlands as areas linked to the public trust. It was held that dim-
inutions of value occurring from regulation were to be discounted as
they reflected an increment involving changing the nature of land to
the harm of the public. Thus, total restriction of intensive use and land
conversion was sustained without compensation.
305. Chung, Controlling the Rate of Residential Growth, A Cost-
Revenue Analysis for the Town of Ramapo, New York, (unpublished
study for the Town of Ramapo, New York, March 29, 1969). The analy-
sis shows that savings will occur in every category: general municipal,
water, fire, sewers, and most substantially in the school rate and costs.
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crease the cost of municipal services and housing, 0 6 and that
land which is developed in a contiguous manner, while providing
substantial open space, is far more valuable than scattered site
development with no common open space. For instance, it has
been suggested that land worth $35 million if developed with-
out regulation would produce $42 million if developed with a
planned network of open space.30 7 Similarly, the court of ap-
peals in Ramapo made conclusive findings that the land re-
stricted in Ramapo for 18 years would have an appreciably higher
value after the period of restriction due to provision of roads,
sewers, water, fire service, park and recreation facilities, drain-
age and other public services which the community was com-
mitted to install as part of the ongoing capital improvement pro-
gram.08
The Metropolitan Council has found that comparable savings
should result from the use of timing and sequential controls in
Planning Area TTT.309 The studies also show that if timing con-
trols are imposed, housing costs should not increase, while sub-
stantial savings should result from adequate provision of munici-
pal facilities including sewage and drainage.310 In most commu-
nities undergoing rapid growth this should also produce savings
in housing and tax costs for middle income families.
In most suburban communities faced with rapid urbanization
the price of housing has increased so sharply that the private
market is incapable of producing low-moderate income housing
without substantial subsidies from the public sector.311 In a
study of the housing market in New Jersey, it was concluded that
even changes in zoning to make land available for higher den-
306. I. SAGALYN & G. STERNIEB, ZONING AND HOUSING COSTS 15
(1973). Low density zoning practices are also ineffective to hold off
development, id. at 69. See also D. HESTER, TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE
LAND UsE GumAi CE SYsTEm: A SunuvmnY AND ANALYSIS OF FIVE MA-
JOR REPORTS (1969).
307. W. WHYTE, THE LAST LADScAPE 185-86 (1968).
308. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 382, 285 NXE.2d 291, 304,
334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 156, appeal dismissed. 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
309. M1n oLTAN D- oPxmENT DIScuSsION STATEMENT, supTa note
10, at 17. In addition, in both Salem, Oregon and Boise, Idaho studies
of the cost of public services indicate that a large amount of randomly
located vacant land in suburban areas creates higher costs in the provi-
sion of many metropolitan and local services which could be avoided
through timed development. Mid-Willamette Valley Council of Govern-
ments, The Costs of Urban Growth for the Salem, Oregon Area 39 (July,
1972); ADA Council of Governments, The Urban Form (Boise, Aug.,
1973).
310. L. SAGALYN & G. STE R1NL, supra note 306, at 56.
311. DOUGLAS CommissIoN, supra note 3.
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sity single family units would not be sufficient to generate hous-
ing for low and moderate income families. 12  Similarly, un-
controverted evidence presented to the trial court in Board of
Supervisors v. DeGroff3 3 demonstrated that the median cost of
housing in Fairfax, Virginia, the largest suburb of Washington,
D.C., is $40,000 and that only persons with incomes of at least
$25,000 can afford such housing.
The advantage of control through the timing and sequence
of growth is not only that a greater, more efficient density with
offsetting public open space may be provided, but also that a
mix of housing and population may be promoted. The Metropoli-
tan Council is committed to the concept of balanced housing uses
throughout the region, and particularly to dispersed and scat-
tered site housing for low and moderate income families.8 1 4 Un-
der recent decisions of the federal courts, interpreting the civil
rights and housing laws, publicly-supported housing for low in-
come families cannot be built in the core cities if it results in
further concentrations of low income and minority persons.8 1,
One court has stated: "For better or for worse, both by legisla-
tive act and judicial decision, this nation is committed to a pol-
icy of balanced and dispersed public housing." 31  Most industries
are leaving the central cities and locating in the suburbs because
of freeway construction and horizontal layouts. 317 With the popu-
lation in central cities becoming increasingly poor and non-white,
industry has left its work force behind, producing extensive com-
muting.318 The provision of low-moderate income housing, par-
312. L. SAGALYN & G. STERNuEB, supra note 306, at 69.
313. 198 S.E.2d 600, 601 (Va. 1973).
314. METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT DIscussIoN STATEMENT, supra note
10, at 4, 8.
315. Shannon v. Department of HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970)
(subsidized housing); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F.
Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969); El Cortez Heights Ass'n v. Tucson Housing
Authority, 10 Ariz. App. 132, 457 P.2d 294 (1969) (public housing); Lake-
wood Homes, Inc. v. City of Lima, 23 Ohio Misc. 211, 258 N.E.2d 470(1970) (apartment houses in suburbia).
316. Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 390 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd,
457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
317. Hearings on Regional Planning Issues Before the Subcomm. on
Urban Affairs of the Joint Economic Comm., 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
2 (invited comments), at 205 (1971) (Burton, The Suburban Crisis and
Industrial Manpower Communities: A Social Planning Proposal); Kain
& Persky, Alternatives to the Gilded Ghetto, 14 PuB. INT. 74 (1969).
318. Blumrosen, The Duty to Plan for Fair Employment: Plant Lo-
cation in White Suburbia, 25 RUTGERs L. Rlv. 383 (1971). The Metro-
politan Council reports that there is a steady trend toward concentration
of the poor and minority groups in the central cities with increasing
suburbanization of employment over the past 20 years. Forty-five per-
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ticularly job-linked housing in the suburbs, is now necessary to
avoid further concentration and blight in the core.310 The Metro-
politan Council has adopted as one of its major goals the provi-
sion of housing opportunities for lower-income persons in new
development areas.320 At the same time the Council desires to
up-grade inner city areas and stabilize older transitional areas in
the central cities and first-ring suburbs.
Timing and sequential controls, by limiting development on
the urban fringe, will permit a redistribution of construction to
inner city, transitional neighborhoods and new town develop-
ment. Growth controls alone, however, will not sufficiently
lower land or housing costs to make it feasible for private enter-
prise to construct low-moderate income housing without subsidy.
Moreover, with the recent moratorium on federal housing sub-
sidy programs and impoundment of funds, the Council will have
to affirmatively implement programs it has already developed to
stimulate construction of such housing. Some of these programs
could be:
(1). A review of federal housing subsidy applications to in-
sure that projects are located in areas of new development;3-1
(2). The development and implementation of regional "fair
share" plans for housing of low-moderate income families in sub-
urban and new development locations;3 22
(3). The development of a regional housing authority with
capacity to develop public and turnkey housing throughout the
region;32
cent of the region's employment is now outside the two central cities.
M ToroOTnr DEVELOPMENT DIscussIoN STATEmENT, supra note 10, at 7.
319. Grier, Negro Ghettos and Housing Policy, 32 LAw & CoNTENW.
PROB. 550 (1967); Silver & Greendale, Job-Linked Housing (American
Jewish Committee Pamphlet, 73-690-19B, 1973).
320. METaOPouTA" fDEvFnoPIENT DiscussIoN STATEMENT, supra
note 10, at 4, 8.
321. See Heyman, Legal Assaults on Municipal Land Use Regula-
tion, 5 URB. LAw. 1 (1973). The federal and state courts are beginning
to enforce mandatory affirmative plans for housing in suburban com-
munities. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union City, 424
F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Town-
ship of Laurelton, 119 N.J. Super. 194, 290 A.2d 465 (1972).
322. See Delaware Valley Regional Plan, The States (C-2, No. 9
Sept. 5, 1973); Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission, A Housing
Plan for the Miami Valley Region (Dec. 1, 1970).
323. Regional housing authorities and central-city-county coopera-
tion agreements for provision of public housing in suburban areas are
being enforced. See Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Au-
thority, 355 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Cuyahoga Metropolitan
Housing Authority v. Cleveland, 342 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Ohio 1972);
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(4). The development, through legislation, of powers to fi-
nance and construct low-moderate income housing through sale
of tax exempt bonds, and with exemption from local zoning and
planning restrictions;324
(5). A request to regional planning authorities to review lo-
cal zoning and planning to ensure that they conform to regional
plans, are non-exclusionary, and make provision for low-moder-
ate income housing 25
The region could also request local and state revenue sharing
to finance housing allowances or rent supplements, provide seed
money, or set up other programs to encourage low-moderate in-
come housing construction.32 6 Whatever the methods used, the
region must make extensive provision for low-moderate income
housing or face the grave danger that a general regional plan-
ning system of growth control will be subject to strict scrutiny
and declared unconstitutional as violating the equal protection of
the laws.327
A major increase in the development of low and moderate in-
come housing can be achieved through local zoning ordinances
and a little used technique known as bonus and incentive zon-
ing. Bonus and incentive zoning is a plan whereby, in return for
certain features or amenities requested by the community, a de-
veloper is allowed to increase his density or extend his design
in a manner that would not otherwise be permitted under
Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Crow v. Brown,
332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
324. Schulman & Reilly, The State Urban Development Corpora-
tion: New York's Innovation, 1 Ur. LAW. 129 (1969); see also Floyd v.
New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 1, 300 N.E.2d 704, 347
N.Y.S.2d 161 (1973) (upholding statutory exemption from zoning for
low-moderate income housing); Goldberg & Elenowitz, Maryland's
Housing Insurance Program, 5 URB. LAW. 524 (1973) (complete analysis
of state and regional housing finance programs).
325. See Board of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Comm., 294 N.E.2d
393 (Mass. 1973) (establishing constitutionality of statute creating state
boards of zoning appeals to review local denials of developer requests
for permits to construct low-moderate income housing). For a discussion
of attacks on exclusionary controls, see Freilich & Bass, Exclusionary
Zoning: Suggested Litigation Approaches, 3 URn. LAw. 344 (1971).
326. See Freilich & Seidel, Recent Trends in Housing Law, Prologue
to the 70's, 2 URB. LAW. 1 (1970).
327. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protec-
tion and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969); Appeal of Girsh,
437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper,
200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959). In Golden v. Planning Bd., 30
N.Y.2d 395, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003




the zoning ordinance.3 28 The bonus must be of sufficient
value to the developer so as to constitute an incentive to pro-
vide the amenity, that is, low and moderate income housing.
Thus if the developer constructs 20 percent of his units as low
and moderate income housing, he can increase his total density
by 20 percent. If the developer does not wish to construct those
units he can provide "money in lieu of units" which will be util-
ized by the community to construct low-moderate income units in
the same planning district, or to provide seed money, rent supple-
ments or housing allowances or support other housing programs
desired by the community. 29 The money-in-lieu provisions
would provide that the developer pay $2,000 per unit plus 20
percent of all profit in excess of $2,000 per unit. It would work
as follows: 33 0
Total Per Unit
(140 units) Projected Sales Volume $5,829,600 $41,640
Expenses:
Raw Land 775,040 5,536
Construction 3,260,040 23,286
Land Imp. (+other) 1,239,420 8,853
Total Expenses $5,274,500 $37,675
Net Profit $ 555,100 $ 3,965
Since his profit is $3,965 per unit, we compute the bonus pay-
ment as follows: 140 X .20 = 28 units.
Total Per Unit
New total units 168






Total Expenses $ 899,892 $32,139
Net Profit $ 266,028 $ 9,501
Density Increase Profit Per Unit $9,501
Base Density Profit Per Unit - 3,965
328. N. MARcus & M. GRovs, THE Nnw ZONING: LEGAL, ADwmUis-
TRATvE, AND EcoNormc CONcEPTS AND TECHmQUES, 131-78 (1970) (de-
scribing extensive use of such systems. For example, in New York,
if a developer constructs a legitimate theatre, he can increase his FAR
(floor area ratio); in San Francisco, if a .developer provides access to
rapid transit, a public plaza, or wide setbacks, he can increase his FAR).
Comment, Bonus or Incentive Zoning-Legal Implications, 21 SYRACUsE
. REV. 895 (1970).
329. See Fairfax County Office of Comprehensive Planning, Density
Bonus Incentives for Providing Low and Moderate Cost Housing for
Fairfax County (Nov. 19, 1973). The provision for "money in lieu of
units" is similar to "money in lieu of land" provisions for neighborhood
park and recreation sites. See Freilich & Levi, Model Regulations for
Control of Land Subdivision, 36 Mo. L. Rnv. 1 (1971).
330. Freilich & Levi, supra note 329, at 1.
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Added Value Per Unit $5,536
$5,536
X 28
Total Added Value $155,008
Amount of Payment Due $155,008





Total "In Lieu" Payment $75,801.60
In Fairfax County, Virginia, the Board of Supervisors at-
tempted to mandate that all developers of 50 or more units must
provide a minimum of 15 percent of the units for low-moderate
income housing, and thereby earn a density bonus.8 31 The cre-
ation of an overlay or floating zone generally was necessary -be-
fore such a large scale project could be undertaken, and since this
required legislative approval following a public hearing, 82 the
possibility of excessive pressure from demonstrative housing
groups made the option to provide low-moderate income hous-
ing less likely to be exercised. It would, however, be possible to
administratively grant bonus and incentive zoning without rely-
ing on zone changes, and hence without requiring specific legisla-
tive approval, through a special permit use controlled adminis-
tratively either by the legislature or an administrative body. 38
One last consideration remains. Savings accrued from
phased construction of capital facilities in the region can be re-
leased for housing in urbanizing areas or in the central cities and
older suburbs (Planning Areas I and II). The region should have
an active program in Areas I and II to prevent problems of aban-
donment, blight, resegregation, turnover of transitional areas,
and block busting. This program should include:
(1). Construction of new towns-in-town for areas of blight
beyond renewal and rehabilitation;834
(2). Judicious use of code enforcement to maintain flexible
standards to prevent further abandonment; 38 5
331. Board of Supervisors v. De Groff Enterprises, 214 Va. 235, 198
S.E.2d 600 (1973); Fairfax County v. Columbia Pike, 213 Va. 437, 192
S.E.2d 778 (1972).
332. Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731
(1950).
333. Kotrich v. County of DuPage, 19 Ill. 2d 181, 166 N.E.2d 601
(1960).
334. M. DERTiCK, NEw TOWNS-IN TOWN (1972).
335. Bross, Law Reform Man Meets the Slumlord, 3 UnB. LAW. 608
(1971); Grad, New Sanctions and Remedies in Housing Code Enforce-
ment, 3 URs. LAW. 577 (1971).
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(3). Adoption of ordinances on sale signs, prevention of
blockbusting and occupancy permits;38 and
(4). Utilization of benevolent quotas and insurance for prop-
erty owners to prevent panic selling and to maintain ra-
cially integrated neighborhoods. 33 7
The last technique is particularly important. The United
States has always insured the mortgage interest but not the eq-
uity in home ownership. By insuring the equity interest of both
the present.and future owner in racially transitional areas, panic
selling for fear of loss of property values is diminished. The
white buyer is also encouraged to enter the market. Since the
region will be contributing funds to suburban areas to provide
low-moderate income families with housing and subsidies, there
is a concomitant duty to provide similar funding for code en-
forcement, housing, insurance and other techniques in the central
cities.
With proper regional planning for land use, housing and
metropolitan problems it becomes possible to solve many of the
problems of the region. Certainly in the last decade we have be-
come aware of some major solutions. If we can contain the
wasteful and inefficient urban sprawl of regional areas, we can
also unleash new finances and energies to return to the problems
of the cities.
VII. CONCLUSION
Any attempt to formulate a growth control guidance system
of timed and sequential development to counterbalance rapid and
sprawling regional growth by channeling development into a
pattern allowing for maximum economic, environmental, physi-
cal and social amenities will of necessity encounter many hurdles.
The control of growth touches sensitive areas which arouse deep
emotions and strong concerns, because the solution to the prob-
lem seems to strike at the very basis of American tradition: ab-
solute ownership of private property.
Although the establishment of such a system is very complex
and the issues it creates are controversial, it is all too evident
that immediate steps need to be taken to meet the challenge and
336. Wolf The Tipping of Racially Changing Neighborhoods, 29 AM.
wsT. PLNn J. 217 (1963).
. 3.37. Committee on Civil Rights, The Use of Quotas, Goals and Af-firmative Action Programs to Overcome the Effects of Racial Discrimina-
tion, 28 REc. oF N.Y.C.B.A. 525 (1973); Ragsdale & Clark, Strategies for
Metropolitan Stabilization, 41 U.MVK.C.L. REv. 1 (1972); Yarmolinsky,
Reassuring The Small Homeowner, 22 Pu. INT. 106 (1971).
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to attempt to arrest the uncontrolled and extremely harmful
growth phenomenon that is taking place in the Minneapolis-St.
Paul region, as well as in other metropolitan regions throughout
the nation. As this Article indicates, there are no insuperable
constitutional problems which will arise in the implementation
of any of the techniques discussed to carry out balanced re-
gional growth policies. All that is needed are statutory pow-
ers which will allow an appropriate range of techniques to be em-
ployed in the system to be brought into existence. Compensa-
tory, regulatory and financial powers are needed at the regional
level to allow regions to: (1) review comprehensive planning of
local communities to insure that local plans and implementing
ordinances are in accord and consistent with regional planning,
particularly housing and capital improvements; (2) provide for
condemnation powers so that open space can be preserved through
land banking, acquisition of development easements and trans-
fers of development rights; (3) provide for financial powers to
insure an adequate supply of low and moderate income housing,
to rehabilitate housing in blighted areas and to provide compen-
sation for affected communities and property owners; and (4)
strengthen inter-governmental cooperation powers of regional
councils of government to authorize full contracting and servic-
ing with localities in all areas of planning and environmental
concerns, including provision of technical service and assistance.
Local governments may require new statutory authorizations to
develop timing and sequential zoning, to utilize interim develop-
ment controls, to provide for capital improvement planning, to
utilize flexible zoning and subdivision powers, to grant assess-
ment relief for restricted property, and to otherwise carry out
needed legislative and administrative powers.
Much of this legislative package could be accomplished
through one of three methods: (1) by incorporating power into
existing legislation; (2) by seeking new legislation for regional
councils; or (3) by seeking new general legislation relating to all
regional planning districts and local governmental units within
a state. It is also essential that further studies be made to forecast
and explore questions that will undoubtedly arise once such re-
gional systems are in place, such as the effect upon land values
and housing costs, the effect upon land assessment rolls, the cost
savings effected by implementation of the system, the distribu-
tion of low-moderate income housing, and the public benefits to
be achieved.
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